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In nearly every area of law and governance, default policies
exist when lawmakers cannot pass new legislation-typically
the status quo simply remains in effect. To its detriment,
United States budget making at both the state and federal
levels lacks effective defaults. If a new budget isn't passed by
year end, there is no budget, and the government shuts
down. The lack of defaults, coupled with a dysfunctional era
of budgetary politics, has led to a number of recent high-
profile and costly government shutdowns at the state and
federal levels.
To date, legal scholarship has failed to address both the
causes and costs of government shutdowns and near
shutdowns, as well as possible solutions to prevent them.
This Article takes up this cause, exploring the history and
sources of recent government shutdowns. Government
shutdowns are the result of a perfect storm of contemporary
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politics: acrimonious budget making characterized by
partisan brinkmanship, game-of-chicken-style negotiation
strategies, and strong anti-tax sentiment among many
conservative legislators. Drawing on political science
research on legislative negotiation theory, this Article
explains how what we call the "new fiscal politics" results in
regular budget negotiation failures, greatly increasing the
risk of costly government shutdowns or near shutdowns.
From this diagnosis of budgetary dysfunction, this Article
advocates for the adoption of default budget policies to
maintain government operations in the event that legislators
fail to pass a timely budget. This Article explains how
default budget policies might be implemented to avert
shutdowns and to stabilize the budget-making process.
Drawing on the experiences of several states with automatic
continuing appropriations provisions and the federal
experience with sequestration, we explore how default budget
policies might work in practice. Properly enacted, default
budget policies have the potential to mitigate the harmful
consequences of budget negotiation failures and to restore
sanity to this era of new fiscal politics.
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INTRODUCTION
Students of negotiation theory quickly learn the
importance of understanding what happens if negotiations fail,
because the consequences of negotiation failure affect
preferences and strategy in the negotiations themselves. 1 With
legislative negotiations, just as with private contract
negotiations, it is thus crucial to understand the default policy
outcomes that occur in the absence of a legislative agreement.
For most legislative negotiations, failure to reach an agreement
results in the prior law remaining in effect. 2 In contrast, at the
United States federal level and in most states, the failure to
regularly pass a new budget agreement results in a
government shutdown. 3
In essence, then, no meaningful default outcome exists
under the current budgeting rules. In recent years, as party
polarization and partisan fiscal politics have made it ever more
difficult to reach agreement, government shutdowns have been
occurring at both the federal 4 and state5 levels with increasing
frequency. But few Americans consider government shutdowns
1. Thus, a central concept of negotiation theory is the so-called "BATNA":
Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. Russel Korobkin, A Positive Theory
of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1795 (2000).
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. This is because the Antideficiency Act prohibits executive branch agents
from authorizing expenditures or obligations in excess of the amount appropriated
by Congress. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); see also SARAH A. BINDER & FRANCES E.
LEE, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 65 (Jane Mansbridge, Cathie Jo
Martin eds., 2013), available at http://www.apsanet.org/Files/Task%20Force%
20Reports/Chapter3Mansbridge.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H8QQ-GXUL
("Failure to enact annual spending bills to fund the government's discretionary
programs forces a government shutdown.").
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. Id.
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to be a functional default option when negotiations fail.6
Instead, government shutdowns create short-term crises that
last until politicians inevitably achieve successful budget
agreements. Yet these shutdowns leave long-term
consequences in their wake. 7
The past decade has seen a steady rise in the number of
government shutdowns. From brief shutdowns in New Jersey
in 2006,8 in Pennsylvania in 2007, 9 and in Minnesota in
2011, 10 to narrowly avoided government shutdowns in Virginia
and in other states, 11 government shutdowns have become
increasingly common. Memorably, California's failure to pass a
budget in 2009 led the state to issue 'I.O.U.s' in lieu of
payments to state workers and contractors, drawing
comparisons to "failed states" like Greece. 12 Meanwhile, the
6. See, e.g., Allison Kopicki, Poll Shows Disapproval of Threat of Government
Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com2013/09/26/
us/politics/poll-shows-disapproval-of-threat-of-government-shutdown.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/T5TF-SDRQ ("Republicans, Democrats, independents
and Tea Party supporters alike object to the threat of a shutdown, the poll says.");
Lori Montgomery, Paul Kane & Rosalind S. Helderman, House GOP Pushes U.S.
to the Edge of a Shutdown, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/politics/house-republicans-to-propose-one-year-delay-in-obamacare/2013/
09/28/le884de6-2859-11e3-9256-41f018d2lb49_story.html, archived at http:I!
perma.cc/TD4K-NHHM ("Leaders of both parties agree that a government
shutdown would be bad for the economy and that a default would be potentially
catastrophic.").
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. A disagreement between Governor Jon Corzine and the state legislature
regarding how to close the state's budget deficit led to a six-day government
shutdown in July 2006. The shutdown led to the idling of 1,000,000 casino and
state agency workers and cost the state at least $3.3 million per day in lost
gambling and lottery revenue. See Richard G. Jones, Deal on Sales Tax Ends
Shutdown in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com
2006/07/07/nyregion/O7budget.html, archived at http://perma.cc/39BH-4LYF.
9. A standoff between Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell and the
Republican-controlled state senate over electricity surcharges led to a one-day
government shutdown in July 2007. See Ian Urbina, Government Shutdown in
Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/us/
09cnd-penn.html?pagewanted=print, archived at http://perma.cc/P7KC-AJ37.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See Katelyn Polantz, McDonnell: Virginia Budget Standoff Imperils State
Services, PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 18, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/rundownlmcdonnell-says-virginia-budget-standoff-imperils-state-services/,
archived at http://perma.cc/M7PZ-PHZQ.
12. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Debate: California Is a Failed State, NEWSWEEK (Mar.
13, 2010, 6:50 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/debate-california-failed-state-71157,
archived at http://perma.cc/M5VS-YUSM; Paul Harris, Will California Become
America's First Failed State?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2009), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2009/oct/04california-failing-state-debt, archived at http://perma.cc/
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federal government has teetered on the brink of shutdown
during most of the major budget negotiations in recent years,
and in October of 2013, the federal government shut down for
the second time in as many decades. 13
In this Article, we apply political science models of
legislative negotiation theory to recent developments in United
States fiscal politics and show why budget negotiation failures
are becoming an increasingly serious problem. We explain how
the combination of rising conservative anti-tax sentiment and
increased partisan polarization has affected budget
negotiations through a combination of trends that we call the
"new fiscal politics." We argue that this environment of new
fiscal politics induces dysfunctional game-of-chicken budget
politics that make negotiation failure far more likely.
Under current budgeting rules, the consequences of these
negotiation failures are costly government shutdowns and near
shutdowns. Government shutdowns waste public resources,
shortchange public-sector employees and government
contractors, and close public services that taxpayers rely on.
Beyond these direct harms, even the credible threat of an
impending government shutdown creates uncertainty and
distrust. As we explain, this uncertainty about the future of
federal and state fiscal policy can harm economic growth, sap
investor confidence in federal debt and state and municipal
bonds, and further undermine the public's faith in government.
Despite the significance of government shutdowns to fiscal
policymaking, legal scholarship has not seriously considered
the causes and costs of government shutdowns or possible
preventive measures. While legal scholars have written
extensively on federal and state budget rules and procedures,
the existing literature provides only fleeting analysis of the
effects of government shutdowns-or near shutdowns-on
budget making. 14
EE2A-QZZ9; James Quinn, California is a Greater Risk Than Greece, Warns JP
Morgan Chief, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 26, 2010, 8:20 PM), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk finance/financialcrisis/7326772/California-is-a-greater-risk-than-Greece-warns-
JP-Morgan-chief.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R7DL-HB2V.
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2065, 2079 (2013) (arguing that gridlock is unlikely to lead to a
government shutdown in instances where both parties fear the consequences of
being seen as holding up progress); Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 715, 725-35 (2012) (analyzing how effecting government shutdowns
may be a source of legislative power for Congress vis-A-vis the President);
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To address the growing problems of government
shutdowns and near shutdowns, we propose the adoption of
default budget policies. Such default policies would prevent
government shutdowns when budget negotiations end in
failure by providing a functional temporary appropriations
procedure until legislators reach a new budget agreement. We
discuss options for how default budget policies might be
implemented and address concerns related to the
implementation of these policies. Unless and until default
budget policies are adopted, we predict that budget negotiation
failures resulting in government shutdowns and near
shutdowns will remain a recurring problem at both the United
States federal and state levels for the foreseeable future.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we identify
the key features unique to budget making, drawing from the
political science literature on "vetogates"-individual or
collective actors whose agreement is required to change the
status quo-and on theoretical models of legislative
negotiations. We argue that the threat of government
shutdowns is far more severe when budget negotiations follow
a game-of-chicken model and when no meaningful default
Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271
(1977) (arguing that, although the United States Constitution provides relatively
few provisions concerning the government's taxing and spending powers, an
elaborate structure of rules, framework legislation, and Supreme Court decisions
have constructed America's "Fiscal Constitution"); Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking
the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 387 (1998) (advocating, among other things, for reform of the budget-
making process around major functional categories rather than between
mandatory and discretionary spending in order to enhance transparency of
budgeting decisions); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconciliation and the Fiscal
Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget Train Wreck, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 589 (1998) (arguing that the congressional reconciliation process
undermines the entire budget process); Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch
Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, Orderly Shutdowns, Presidential
Impeachments, and Judicial Coups, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 503, 516-521
(2002) (arguing that the 1995-96 Republican-forced government shutdowns were
a breakdown of inter-branch norms and the Constitutional imperative for
Congress not to use its appropriations power to shut down a coordinate branch of
government); Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988)
(arguing that the Constitution imposes on Congress an obligation to limit the
amount and duration of each grant of spending authority and a limitation on the
executive branch not to raise or spend funds not appropriated by explicit
legislative action); Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1988) (exploring how the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and sequestration altered the federal budget
process's "fiscal constitution").
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option exists in the event of a negotiation failure.
Unfortunately, as we discuss in Part II, the conditions that
we call the new fiscal politics make it far more likely that
budget negotiations will follow the game-of-chicken model. The
rise of a strident conservative anti-tax ideology, increasing
political party polarization, the decline of competitive
congressional districts, and the limited disciplining power of
voters at the polls combine to create a perfect storm for budget-
making dysfunction-resulting in a series of government
shutdowns and near shutdowns.
Further, as we discuss in Part III, even when voters are
demonstrably unhappy with politicians' failures to reach
budget agreements, the conditions of the new fiscal politics
limit the effectiveness of voter discipline of elected
representatives. To illustrate the harms that result from
government shutdowns and near shutdowns, we briefly survey
the 1995-1996 and 2013 federal government shutdowns,
California's budget crises between 2008 and 2012, and the 2011
Minnesota state government shutdown. We also evaluate the
likelihood of future state and federal budget standoffs. We
conclude that, without the adoption of some form of default
budget policies, government shutdowns are likely to remain a
recurring problem even when voters strongly disapprove of
them.
Finally, in Part IV, we make the case for the adoption of
default budget policies. We evaluate the partial default budget
policies currently in effect for state governments in Wisconsin
and Rhode Island. We further discuss the lessons that can be
learned from the federal experience with sequestration, which
we argue operates similarly to a partial default budget policy.
We then analyze options for how a default budget policy might
be implemented. In doing so, we address the possible
counterargument that the threat of government shutdowns is
necessary in order to induce compromise among legislators. We
conclude that such a compromise-forcing device is probably
unnecessary, and that, in any case, better options exist to
induce legislative compromise than the costly threat of
government shutdowns.
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
I. DEFAULT RULES AND THE NEGOTIATION THEORY OF
BUDGET MAKING
In a variety of contexts, legal scholarship has generated
powerful insights by analyzing default rules. From contracts to
property, many areas of law have default provisions that fill
gaps in incomplete agreements, 15 or that serve as baseline
outcomes that parties may negotiate to alter. 16 Budget making
stands as one of the few areas of law that lacks defaults; 17
when the present law expires at every year's end, there is no
default fallback. 18 Lawmakers must engage in repeated
negotiations and agreements to produce a new budget. 19
Because no meaningful defaults exist for budgeting, 20
government shutdowns will occur whenever no new budget is
passed in time to replace the expiring law.21 Drawing on
theoretical modeling of legislative games, and aided by an
understanding of default rules, this Part explains why modern-
day budget negotiations are more prone to fail, and why the
lack of budget defaults both increases the likelihood of failure
and exacerbates the consequences of such failures-resulting in
government shutdowns and near shutdowns.
We draw on two helpful models of legislative budgeting
from political science-the logrolling model and the game-of-
15. For a general discussion of default rules in contract negotiations, see Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
16. For a discussion of the benefits of default rules in property law, see, for
example, Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
17. An important exception to this is so-called "sunset" legislation. Congress
has only occasionally implemented such provisions in non-budgetary legislation,
which alter defaults over time by purposefully creating a termination date on
legislation absent subsequent renewal. This legislative form is more frequently
used by states. See Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 401 (1978). More recently, Rebecca Kysar has argued forcefully in
favor of a presumption against legislation enacted with sunset provisions given
the previously understated costs and overrated benefits of such temporary
enactments. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007
(2011).
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian
Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1327 (2001).
20. Congress passes budgets for the fiscal year commencing the subsequent
October 1 and ending the following September 30. See 31 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012).
21. One could argue that the government shutting down is the default, and in
a sense that is correct. But we think it is more intuitive to conceive of government
shutdowns as a result of the absence of a meaningful default for budgeting.
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chicken model. The logrolling model depicts a system of
majority rule voting in which a coalition assembles its majority
by making concessions to prospective coalition members. 22 In
contrast, the game-of-chicken model depicts negotiation among
rigid coalitions that issue take-it-or-leave-it threats to one
another to gain concessions. 23 As we will explain, in this era of
new fiscal politics, legislative deal making around budgets less
frequently resembles the logrolling model and increasingly
resembles the game-of-chicken model.
A. Modeling Legislative Budget Negotiations
As any civics textbook teaches, the American system of
government is characterized by numerous Madisonian "checks
and balances" 24 at both the federal and state levels, which-
among other things-reduce the ease with which lawmakers
can change the status quo. These checks and balances serve to
slow the enactment of new legislation,25 and are often regarded
as desirable, 26 as slowing legislative change may create more
policy stability over time by mitigating the effects of short-term
variations in public opinion and voting behavior. 27 Yet the
presence of numerous checks and balances also creates
22. For an overview of the logrolling model in game theory, see JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 151-53 (2004); see also Gordon
Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571 (1959) (describing the
dynamics of logrolling in majority voting systems).
23. For general discussion of the game-of-chicken model, see WARD
FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW
126-35 (2007); Anatol Rapoport & Albert M. Chammah, The Game of Chicken, 10
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 10 (1966).
24. The concept of checks and balances in American politics largely owes its
origins to Madison's writings in The Federalist, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), although other early modern political
philosophers such as John Locke and Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de
Montesquieu, had also previously advocated for the advantages of a separation of
powers. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett 1980); CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, MONTESQUIEU: THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS (Cohler, Miller, & Stone eds., Cambridge University Press 1989).
25. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633, 643-45 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Torsten Persson et al., Separation of Powers and Political
Accountability, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1163 (1997) (arguing that, properly calibrated,
separation of powers disciplines opposing public officials to the benefit of voters,
producing greater accountability, eliciting information for voters, and preventing
abuses of powers).
27. Id.
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vetogates that shape the nature of the legislative budgeting
game. The political science literature on institutional decision-
making generally uses the terms "veto points," "veto players,"
and "vetogates" interchangeably-all three terms describe a
person or institutional body that must consent in order for
legislation to be passed. 28
Drawing on legislative negotiation theory and thinking of
budgeting as a legislative game allows us to focus on how the
players' incentives interact with the procedural rules-and the
lack of default rules.29 The simplest model approaches budget
making as a majority-rule game, where a majority coalition
needs only the votes of 50 percent plus one of all legislators in
order to pass a budget. Of course, in practice, budget making is
complicated by the presence of multiple vetogates, which can
obstruct the will of a simple majority. 30
Among the most important vetogates at the federal level
are those established in the so-called Presentment Clause of
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, which requires
legislation to be passed by majorities in both the House and the
Senate and then signed by the President, or else passed by a
two-thirds majority in both chambers to overcome the
President's veto. 31 Thus, a simple majority in the House or
Senate-as well as the President-can block new legislation.
Moreover, the increasingly frequent use of Senate filibusters
has led to the routine need for cloture votes to overcome the
28. The term veto players has been in common parlance since its use in
George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 289 (1995), and has been elaborated in GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO
PLAYERS: How POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002). The term vetogates is also
frequently used. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates, Chevron,
Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441 (2007); Matthew McCubbins et al.,
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80
GEO. L.J. 705 (1992). This Article uses these terms interchangeably throughout.
29. For a general discussion of the modeling of legislative games, see
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, especially chapters 10-12 and 15-16, and
ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000), especially chapters 2-
3.
30. In contrast, under parliamentary systems of government, the need to
regularly pass budgets is rarely a problem, as there are few impediments to the
majority coalition enacting its preferred policies. See COOTER, supra note 29, at
215; William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523 (1991).
31. Other veto players are important too, especially appropriations
subcommittees and the reconciliation process. See Krishnakumar, supra note 14.
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filibuster and to pass legislation. 32  Since a three-fifths
supermajority is required to invoke cloture, this supermajority
requirement 33 can function as its own separate vetogate that
enables the minority party or minority coalition to stall or block
legislation. 34 This can also confer additional leverage for those
who strategically hold out for additional concessions before
agreeing to join the majority coalition. 35 As a result of these
vetogates, during times of divided government no political
party will usually be able to pass a budget on its own.36
Similar vetogates operate at the state level, 37 with some
variation amongst the states.38 Moreover, many states have
32. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L. REV. 29, 52-53 (1999)
(finding that the filibuster and other supermajority requirements play an
increasingly large role in structuring legislation); Ben Frumin & Jason Reif, The
Rise Of Cloture: How GOP Filibuster Threats Have Changed The Senate, TALKING
POINTS MEMO (Jan. 27, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.comI
2010/01/the-rise-of-cloture-how-gop-filibuster-threats-have-changed-the-senate
.php, archived at http://perma.cc/HK6X-2SET (same). But see Benjamin Eidelson,
The Majoritarian Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980 (2013) (observing that since
Senate composition is not based on an equal distribution of population across the
states, over the past two decades, a majority of successful filibustering coalitions
have actually represented more United States citizens than the majority
coalitions they stymied).
33. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and
Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1125-26
(2006) (comparing the effects of majority and supermajority requirements for the
passage of legislation).
34. However, note that current federal legislative rules often allow the
majority party to bypass the filibuster for budget legislation that qualifies under
the reconciliation process. We thus discuss the filibuster in the main text due to
its salience as an example, not because it is necessarily of particular importance
to budgeting. Other federal veto points that may be relevant include the more
limited powers of congressional committees to prevent new legislation from
coming to a floor vote, and the agenda-setting powers of the majority party
leadership in each chamber, among others.
35. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 421 (1998).
36. Except when one party controls both chambers of Congress and the
presidency (or, at the state level, both the governorship and the state legislature),
it will not always be clear which party should be considered the majority political
party. Nevertheless, we use the term majority political party to loosely refer to
whichever party controls more of the levers of government.
37. See, e.g., Gerald Benjamin, Reform in New York: The Budget, The
Legislature, and the Governance Process, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2004) ("It is
commonplace that the constitutional design of the New York political system, like
that of the nation and all but one of the states, creates a three-way relationship
for peak political decision making among the executive and each house of a
bicameral legislature.").
38. Nebraska, for instance, has a unicameral state legislature. Id. at 1028
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supermajority rules for passing budgets or for raising taxes,
which can create further vetogates through which minority
coalitions can block policy changes supported by the majority.39
For instance, until very recently, California had a
supermajority requirement to pass the state budget, creating a
minority-party vetogate whereby the minority party legislators
could block any budget.4 0 Because this requirement remains for
tax increases, 41 as long as the minority party maintains a
united front and controls at least one-third of the votes in at
least one of the chambers of the state legislature, the minority
party can continue to function as a vetogate with respect to any
budget proposals that include tax increases. 42
Default rules also alter incentives and behavior. In most
ordinary legislative settings, legislators bargain to alter
already-existing laws. For example, when leaders in Congress
negotiated to pass the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (often known as the "ACA" or, more colloquially, as
"Obamacare") in late 2009 and early 2010, they negotiated
against the background of current health care laws and
policies. 43 Had Congress failed to pass the ACA, the status quo
n.29.
39. See Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget, NAT'L CONF.
STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/researchlfiscal-policy/supermajority-vote-
requirements-to-pass-the-budget.aspx (last updated Oct. 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/H2FC-5JNG.
40. The Riley-Stewart Amendment, approved by state voters in 1933,
required a two-thirds majority vote for the California State Legislature to pass a
budget. Riley-Stewart initially limited the two-thirds requirement to budgets
exceeding 105 percent of the previous year's spending, but 1962's Proposition 16
extended this limitation to nearly all legislative appropriations, including the
budget, and thus until 2010 the passage of any budget required a two-thirds
majority. See Seanna M. Sheffrin, Tax Reform Commissions in the Sweep of
California's Fiscal History, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 661, 673 (2010). This was
overturned by Proposition 25, the On Time Budget Act of 2010, which exempted
appropriations in the budget bill or other bills providing appropriations related to
the budget bill from being subject to the two-thirds requirement. See Proposition
25, CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE GENERAL ELECTION, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/
2010/general/propositions/25/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014), archived at http://
perma.ccIV6WZ-F9VL; CAL. SECRETARY OF ST., VOTES FOR AND AGAINST
NOVEMBER 2, 2010, STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES (2011), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/UHS5-RNVC.
41. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(d).
42. For the past several decades, Republicans have been the minority party in
California, yet they have usually controlled enough seats to exercise veto points
due to the supermajority rules.
43. For discussion of the ACA, see David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising
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would have remained unchanged. In contrast, when legislators
fail to pass an annual budget on time, most appropriations
must halt entirely and the government shuts down.44
B. Logrolling and Game-of-Chicken Negotiations
Of the two major political-science models of legislative
negotiations, the logrolling 45 model probably best describes the
majority of legislative negotiations over the course of United
States history. 46 In particular, the logrolling model tends to
describe legislative negotiations more accurately when
minority party discipline is weak and when a majority party
coalition is relatively easy to assemble. 47 In order to pass a
budget under the logrolling model, the majority coalition offers
enticements to swing members of the majority party as well as
moderate members of the minority party in order to induce
them to support the majority coalition's budget. 48 Since
individual legislators represent their geographic regions and
not just their parties, the majority coalition can induce
compromise by offering "pork" for legislators' home districts. 49
The resulting budget will thus usually be a compromise
from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed
to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV.
669, 669-70 (2012).
44. For a discussion on why appropriations come to a halt, see supra note 3;
see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 1120 ("[T]he status quo-the
failure to pass a budget-results in zero spending ... ").
45. For a basic overview of logrolling, see supra note 22.
46. Note that this section assumes a highly constrained institutional
environment in which the majority party controls the agenda-setting process and
domain space for alternatives is limited. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R.
Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE
503, 508 (1981). However, this assumption largely represents the budget-making
process given that one party will always be in the majority for the purposes of
setting the agenda.
47. See supra note 22, and accompanying text.
48. This can usually be accomplished because the costs to the coalition of
providing concessions to a swing vote or holdout are smaller than the benefits of
their joining the coalition, and vice versa. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754, 800, n.171 (1983).
49. Note that we do not necessarily believe logrolling budget making produces
normatively better budget outcomes. As this observation indicates, logrolling often
produces significant misallocations of funding through pork barrel politicking to
trade votes. See, e.g., Diana Evans, Policy and Pork: The Use of Pork Barrel
Projects to Build Policy Coalitions in the House of Representatives, 38 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 894 (1994).
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between the preferences of the majority party leadership and
the preferences of the most centrist members of both the
majority and minority parties.
Under this model, the majority party leadership's influence
often depends on how easily it can assemble a coalition
amongst party members. It also depends on how cohesive the
interests of the minority party members are, and whether the
intensity of preference among them is weak enough that the
majority can offer sufficient concessions to obtain agreement. 50
If the majority party leadership has multiple prospective
coalition partners among the centrist members of the majority
and minority parties, then the majority party leadership may
pass a budget closer to its true preference. 51 Conversely, if the
majority party leadership must secure the votes of nearly every
potential swing vote, then it may be forced to agree to many of
these legislators' demands. 52
In times of divided government, the key to successful
logrolling will typically be the moderate members of the
minority party; these legislators might be enticed to vote with
the majority party coalition in order to get a modified version of
the majority's budget through the chamber controlled by the
minority party. For instance, the contrasts between the repeal
of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and the passage of the ACA
are instructive recent examples of the differences between
logrolling when there are many moderate minority party
members to choose from, and logrolling when the majority
coalition has almost no options from which to pick. Ahead of
the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell in the fall of 2010, Senate
Democrats needed to win over only a handful of moderate
Republicans amongst a number of possible choices to achieve a
cloture-proof 60-member supermajority coalition. 53 Once a
filibuster-proof coalition had been assembled, several
additional moderate Republicans ultimately joined the vote
anyway, likely so they could be part of a seemingly inevitable
winning coalition. 54 In contrast, uniform Republican opposition
50. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC
CHOICE 322 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. For a description of this effort, see Steve Kornacki, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell .
1993-2010, SALON (Dec. 18, 2010, 2:05 PM), httpJ/www.salon.comI2010/12/18/dont ask
dontteUlrepealed, archived at http://perma.cc/67QX-5AVM.
54. Eight Republicans ultimately joined Democrats in passing the repeal, a
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to the ACA forced Democrats to pass the bill without a single
Republican vote in the Senate. 55 Democrats had to achieve
unanimous support among their caucus of 60 to overcome
cloture, requiring significant concessions to the most centrist
members of their own party to form the coalition; no moderate
Republicans availed themselves of the winning coalition. 56
The repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell teaches that when
minority party discipline is weak and individual members of
the minority party vote based on their own preferences, the
majority party can usually entice some members of the
minority to form a coalition without significant concessions. 57
This can be especially true of budget making, since the process
consists of numerous smaller policy choices and amounts
among many different programs. Individual politicians will
have far stronger preferences about some fiscal policy choices
than others, so when minority party discipline is weak, the
majority party can usually form a coalition to pass a budget. 58
In contrast to the logrolling model, the game-of-chicken
model tends to describe negotiations when minority party
discipline is strong, and vetogates necessitate at least some
65-member majority that surpassed the necessary 60 votes Democrats had
initially struggled to assemble. Senate Vote 281 - Repeals 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/l11/senate/
2/281, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8HU-KUQE.
55. The Act ultimately passed the Senate with exactly 60 votes. See Senate
Vote 396 - Passes Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2009), http://politics.
nytimes.com/congress/votes/111/senate/l/396, archived at http://perma.cc/PEB4-
G4AZ.
56. For example, even though Senate Democrats had a majority in the
Senate, in order to secure Senator Nelson's crucial 60th vote to end cloture on the
ACA, Senate Democrats conceded to both so-called pork barrel spending to
Nelson's home state of Nebraska, as well as to additional limitations on the
availability of abortions in insurance sold in state exchanges. See Huma Khan,
President Obama Hails Senate Health Care Bill as Ben Nelson Jumps on Board,
ABC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/HealthCare/senator-
ben-nelson-approves-health-care-bill-obama/story?id=9381054, archived at http:/
perma.cc/888T-8XNG.
57. The concessions offered to minority party legislators need not be pork
barrel spending such as in the examples above. The concessions might
alternatively be made with respect to non-pork barrel policies for which specific
individual members of the minority party have relatively strong preferences. See
Stratmann, supra note 50, at 325 ('Members sell their votes for issues they do not
feel intensely about and secure votes on public goods issues that are intensely
favored by them. Expected utility is maximized when costs of selling another vote
equal benefits from obtaining another vote. At this point, an equilibrium is
reached that maximizes a social welfare function.").
58. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 1141.
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minority party support. If the majority party cannot entice a
sufficient number of centrist members of the minority parties
to break ranks, then the majority party may need to negotiate
with the leadership of the minority party itself in the hope of
forging a bipartisan compromise budget. Party-line voting can
thus turn budget negotiations into a partisan game of chicken
where neither party can peel away enough members of the
opposition in order to form a coalition capable of passing a
budget without the cooperation of the other party's
leadership. 59
Budget negotiations that follow the game-of-chicken model
are far more likely to result in negotiation failure because
compromise outcomes are more difficult to achieve. 60 Even if
every player would prefer a compromise to the default outcome,
they may still fail to reach a compromise, triggering the default
in spite of their preferences.6 1 In considering why game-of-
chicken models are far likelier to result in negotiation failure,
it is useful to imagine the classic adolescent-dare version of the
game of chicken. In this game, two teenagers drive cars directly
at one another, with the loser being the teenager who swerves
first so as to avoid collision. In such an instance, both teenagers
strongly prefer to avoid collision. Nevertheless, because neither
teenager wants to swerve first (and to thereby lose the game
and be called a chicken), there is a risk that both teenagers
miscalculate and think that the other teenager will swerve
first. Thus, the game can result in the analogue to negotiation
failure-a deadly collision. As Ward Farnsworth notes, people
are "killed every year playing the automotive version of
chicken. ' ' 62  Part III of this Article, describing recent
government shutdowns, provides several clear examples of
game-of-chicken negotiations that resulted in failure.
Two major differences between the game-of-chicken model
59. Of course, unlike a classic game of chicken, there are a continuous rather
than discrete number of options for the two parties to choose between. We do not
claim in this section that budget negotiations in a partisan party-line
environment are precisely like the game of chicken, but rather that the intuitions
provided by the game shed light on the dynamics we describe.
60. See, e.g., Brendan Greeley, The Debt Ceiling Deal: The Case for Caving,
BLOOMBERG BuSINESSWEEK (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com
magazine/the-debt-ceiling-deal-the-case-for-caving-08032011.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/4E35-V6BZ.
61. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U.
PENN. L. REV. 991, 1024 (2008).
62. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 216.
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and the logrolling model concern (a) whose preferences dictate
the likely outcomes, and (b) the manner in which default
outcomes alter bargaining positions. First, in logrolling models,
the preferences that matter most are those of the majority
party's leadership and of the moderate members of both
parties. The preferences of the orthodox members of the
minority party are unlikely to influence the outcome.6 3 In
contrast, because each political party's leadership controls a
vetogate in game-of-chicken models, the majority leadership's
preferences are no likelier to dictate the outcome than are the
minority leadership's preferences. Additionally, the more
moderate members of the minority party-including, in some
cases, the party's leadership-may not have any more influence
than the more orthodox members, depending on which
members control the relevant vetogates.
64
Moreover, game-of-chicken negotiations stand in contrast
to logrolling negotiations, where the outcome will generally be
a compromise between the majority party and the members of
the minority party enticed to vote with the majority. Outcomes
in game-of-chicken negotiations may depend more on the
parties' negotiating tactics and on their relative aversion to
negotiation failure. As a result, as in any negotiation between
bilateral monopolies, the outcome will depend on the relative
63. During negotiations over the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, for example,
hardline supporters of the policy such as Senator John McCain argued stridently
that the policy should not be changed while troops were deployed in active combat
zones. See David M. Herszenhorn, McCain on 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Don't Rush,
N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/12/02/mccain-on-dont-ask-dont-tell-dont-rush/, archived at
http://perma.cc/97M5-4GUP. He was nonetheless overruled and the repeal went
into effect with the armed forces still deployed in active combat zones. See Senate
Vote 281 - Repeals 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell" supra note 54.
64. Several of the recent budget negotiations have reflected this phenomenon,
including instances in which the leadership of the party is outvoted by its caucus.
For example, in recent years Speaker of the House John Boehner has repeatedly
been forced to pull bills he has brought for a vote in the face of substantial
opposition from his own party, imperiling a bill's passage and undermining his
leadership of the party. See Naftali Bendavid & Carol E. Lee, House Postpones
Vote on Boehner Debt Plan, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424053111904800304576474072808358338, archived at
http://perma.cc/M9Z4-SAL3 (noting Boehner's failed attempt to corral support to
raise the federal debt ceiling and subsequent postponement of a full vote, "a
rejection [of which] could undermine his speakership"); Janet Hook et al.,
Boehner's Budget "Plan B" Collapses, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2012), http://online.wsj
.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324461604578191453200498818, archived
at http://perma.cc/R5E3-2PL2 (describing Boehner's failure to get caucus support
for a 2012 compromise budget bill that included some tax increases).
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bargaining power of the leadership of the majority and
minority parties. 65  In the budget-making process, this
bargaining power significantly depends on the degree to which
the parties fear the consequences of failure, as we discuss
below in Part I.C. In the context of budget negotiations,
whichever party's leadership is less concerned about the threat
of a government shutdown will often have more bargaining
power in bilateral budget negotiations. This is critical to the
dynamics of budgeting because unlike other areas of
lawmaking, the status quo will not remain in the event of
negotiation failure.
C. Vetogates and Default Rules
The outcome of any legislative negotiation game depends
on the default outcome-what happens if legislation is not
passed. Often, the default outcome is simply the status quo, in
that failure to pass new legislation means that the previously
existing laws remain in effect unaltered. However, in the
absence of continuing appropriations, failure to pass a budget
means that no appropriations are made and government
operations gradually grind to a halt. Rational choice theory
suggests that default outcomes can alter the negotiation
position of parties. 66
The literature on contracts law has long observed that
altering default rules can alter the bargaining positions and
the strategic behavior of parties. 67 What's different about
budget making is that it is a contract between (political) parties
that must take place. Whereas default rules in contract law are
typically referenced with regard to filling gaps in incomplete
agreements, in the budget process default rules are most
relevant in determining what happens if no agreement is
reached whatsoever.
In ordinary appropriations settings, the absence of a
default rule for budgets usually functions as a strong form of
65. See, e.g., John Charles Bradbury & W. Mark Crain, Legislative
Organization and Government Spending: Cross-Country Evidence, 82 J. PUB.
ECON. 309, 313 (2001).
66. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 33, at 1146 ("Legislators'
preference for legislation can be profoundly affected by what the status quo is in
the absence of the legislation.").
67. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 615-18 (1990).
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penalty-default rule.68 A simple example illustrates this
phenomenon: consider a hypothetical city council renewing
funding for firefighters' salaries with a default outcome that
zero firefighters will be employed. Even if council members
widely disagree on the ideal number of firefighters, they will be
highly motivated to assemble some form of majority coalition to
fund a non-zero number of firefighters. However, if the default
outcome is the previous year's funding level, then council
members may be far more comfortable insisting on their
preferences even to the point of negotiation failure, knowing
full well that the status quo will remain in the event of
disagreement.
However, the absence of a default budget can function as a
distorted penalty-default rule when only one party is highly
averse to negotiation failure, because the default outcome
penalizes only that party. The threat of government shutdowns
gives significant leverage to holdouts. 69 To see why, consider a
hypothetical in which Party B wants to avoid a government
shutdown at all costs, while Party A may prefer to avoid a
shutdown but isn't strongly averse to one and is highly
motivated to extract significant concessions from Party B. If
Party A can make Party B think that Party B's only option for
avoiding a government shutdown is to agree to Party A's
demands, and if Party B will do almost anything to avoid a
shutdown, then Party A will be able to pass the budget Party A
desires because the costs of negotiation failure are much
greater for Party B. Thus, armed with the threat of a
government shutdown, Party A can extract a more favorable
budget deal than it could were there no threat of a shutdown.
This dynamic alters and arguably distorts the negotiation
process.
Thus, in two-player negotiations, when one coalition or
political party is significantly more averse to the default
outcome, that party or coalition is, ceteris paribus, at a
structural disadvantage in negotiations as compared to the less
68. For an explanation of penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There
Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589 (2005); Eric
Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 557
(2006).
69. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 35, at 421 ("The threat of a
government shutdown gives significant leverage to holdouts."). Holdouts occur
whenever legislators who may otherwise support a bill refuse to do so in order to
extract other benefits in addition. See id. at 404.
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averse party. Likewise, the party that is more comfortable with
the default outcome can have a structural advantage because
at any time that party may more credibly threaten to walk
away from the negotiations, and they may use this threat as
leverage in negotiations. 70
Even more troubling is that even when both parties
strongly prefer to pass a compromise budget over a government
shutdown, negotiation failure may still occur because both
parties face strong incentives to appear unwilling to
compromise. This is especially so when party polarization is
high and legislators face internal pressure from party
ideologues, as we describe below in Part II. 7 1 Thus, if Party B
bluffs to Party A that it will not accede to Party A's demands,
then Party A must determine whether it believes Party B is
being honest; if it doesn't, it may press forward assuming Party
B will fold. And if Party B assumes Party A will fold, and
neither blinks, the government will shut down.
Thus, in divided government settings, the extent to which
the outcomes of a game-of-chicken model are likely to follow the
majority party's preferences or the minority party's
preferences-or neither-depends largely on: (a) how
comparatively averse each party is to the default outcome; (b)
the negotiation tactics employed by each party; and (c) how
well each party can predict whether the other will blink. 72 If
one party is significantly less averse to a government shutdown
than is the other party, the less averse party may be capable of
making an offer in the bargain set closest to their most
preferred outcome, knowing that the more averse party cannot
70. This is akin to other rational choice theory predictions in negotiations
between two parties where one party has far more fixed preferences or a greater
strength of commitment than does the other, or is willing to make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, or both; rational choice analysis suggests the former will be at an
advantage in negotiations with the latter. See COOTER, supra note 29, at 220 ("In
general, the actor in a bargaining situation who succeeds in making a credible
commitment gains an advantage by losing the power to compromise.").
71. See Rapoport & Chammah, supra note 23, at 10 ("The usual argument for
brinkmanship is that if one can convince the other player that one is unalterably
committed to [not compromising], for example, by letting him know that one has
deliberately destroyed one's own freedom of choice (burned one's bridges), then
one can safely [pursue his first choice] (against a rational opponent).").
72. Of course, some negotiators are simply better at bluffing and at employing
other negotiation tactics. If the leadership of the party that is more averse to a
government shutdown is more skilled at negotiation tactics, that party may be
able to achieve most of its goals despite the structural disadvantage that results
from the party being more averse to negotiation failure.
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afford negotiation failure (leading to government shutdown).
This is true regardless of whether the less averse party is the
majority party or the minority party.
We have just captured the budget-making dynamic where
no default budget rules exist and game-of-chicken-style
negotiations are rampant. While legislative gridlock has long
been lamented, it can be particularly problematic for fiscal
policy: budgets must be passed. But, in times of divided
government, the majority party will usually be unable to pass a
budget without the support of at least some members of the
minority party. 73 Outside of budgetary policy, the American
system of checks and balances serves to slow the enactment of
new legislation. This is arguably desirable in order to prevent
rushed legislation pushed through Congress by an unstable
and temporary governing majority. But when it comes to
passing budgets, the vetogates created by the American system
of checks and balances produce the threat of government
shutdowns. 74 And in the highly partisan climate of the new
fiscal politics-which we discuss in Part II-budget
negotiations are much more likely to resemble a game of
chicken, with an increased risk of down-to-the-wire bargaining
and negotiation failure. This contest gives a potential
structural advantage for the party least fearful of such failure
and concomitant risk of a government shutdown.
II. THE NEW FISCAL POLITICS AND GAME-OF-CHICKEN-STYLE
BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS
Having outlined the unique characteristics of budgeting-
wherein game-of-chicken-style budget negotiations threaten
government shutdowns and impair effective budget making-
we next argue that the collective trends we call the "new fiscal
politics" contribute to precisely such dysfunctional game-of-
73. Some have argued that gridlock can actually be a form of policy stability,
and some empirical work has shown that divided government itself has far less of
an effect on gridlock than the preferences of veto players. See Manabu Saeki,
Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government
and Veto Players, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 587 (2009). Nevertheless, since budgets
expire at year's end leading to government shutdowns, gridlock in the budget-
making process leads to anything but stability. For a general discussion of
gridlock and divided government, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN:
PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002 (2005).
74. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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chicken-style budget negotiations. Today's political climate
features substantial ideological opposition to nearly all forms of
taxation. This is largely, although not exclusively, due to an
increasingly powerful and fiscally conservative segment of
voters generally aligned with the Republican Party.75
Accompanying the rise of a rigid anti-tax ideology is the trend
toward heightened party polarization among both the
Democratic and Republican parties over the last several
decades. Fewer moderate members of Congress exist to
function as swing legislators, able to induce compromise
between the parties by straddling ideological positions. 76 In
addition, internally incoherent fiscal policy preferences among
voters generally means that voters are unlikely to punish
legislators who fail to compromise, even when voters strongly
disapprove of their unwillingness to come to agreement. 77 As a
result, few structural incentives remain for politicians to seek
compromise, and those politicians who do are often punished
for it in party primaries. The combination of voters' conflicting
and asymmetric fiscal policy preferences and a declining
number of competitive House districts 78 incentivizes legislators
to indulge their bases instead of forging compromise.
We argue that in this environment of new fiscal politics,
legislative budget negotiations increasingly resemble game-of-
chicken negotiations rather than logrolling negotiations.
Legislator preferences are fixed, few moderate members of the
minority coalition can be brought into the majority coalition
through logrolling, and both parties have an incentive to
75. See infra Part II.A.
76. See infra Part II.B.
77. See infra Part I.C.
78. See Thomas E. Mann, Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much
Does Gerrymandering Matter?, in 1 RED AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS
AND CAUSES OF AMERICA'S POLARIZED POLITICS 269 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W.
Brady eds., 2006) (discussing the decline in the number of marginal house seats
(those decided within the range of 55 to 45 percent of the two-party district vote)).
However, it is arguable that gerrymandering itself has little to do with the
decrease in competitive House seats. See Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander &
Matthew Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in
U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006) (finding that demographic change and
ideological realignment within the electorate, not gerrymandering, is the cause for
the substantial increase in the number of safe House districts since the 1970s);
Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause
Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. Sci. 666 (2009) (finding that gerrymandering
generally does not cause polarization, but has resulted in an increase in the
Republican seat share in the House).
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appear unwilling to compromise (to achieve their preferred
bargaining outcome) and little incentive to appear conciliatory
(since they rarely face direct consequences for refusal to
cooperate, and sometimes face direct consequences for being
seen as turncoats). Additionally, as we have discussed above, in
the absence of budget defaults, partisan game-of-chicken
budget negotiations are far more likely to result in government
shutdowns or near shutdowns. This Part identifies these
elements of the new fiscal politics and explains why they
contribute to such shutdowns and near shutdowns.
A. The Rise of Conservative Anti-Tax Ideology
The contemporary anti-tax, anti-government Tea Party
movement is only the most recent manifestation of a decades-
long "tax revolt" that has developed in American politics. In
recent decades, categorical opposition to taxation has increased
dramatically among citizens and politicians. 79 Though far from
the first tax revolt in United States history, the passage of
California's Proposition 13 in 1978 was a watershed moment
for contemporary opposition to taxation.80 Proposition 13,
which dramatically capped residential property tax increases
by restricting increases in assessment values to at most 2
percent per year, also imposed a supermajority requirement for
tax increases passed by the California state legislature.8 1 Many
79. See, e.g., Fred Block, Read Their Lips: Taxation and the Right-Wing
Agenda, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 68-85 (Isaac William Martin et al., eds., 2009)
(describing the rise of the anti-tax conservative movement in American politics
over the last thirty years).
80. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution:
The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819,
909 (2002). Contrary to common perception, however, Kornhauser argues that
Proposition 13 sprung not from a bottom-up popular rebellion but a well-
organized campaign of zealous anti-tax advocates. A similar argument is made by
Daniel Smith, who argues that "Proposition 13 ushered in [the] era of faux
populist moments." DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 49 (1998).
81. The Original Proposition 13, HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASS'N (May 6,
2006), http://www.hjta.org/propositionsproposition- 13/original-proposition- 13,
archived at http://perma.cc/T74C-FYZA. More recently, California voters
cemented their desire to make any form of tax hike difficult to pass. Proposition
26, passed in November of 2010, altered California's constitution by explicitly
requiring that not only taxes, but also increases in state or local fees, be passed by
a two-thirds majority in the legislature. CAL CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3; CAL CONST.
art. XIIIC, § 1.
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scholars have observed the ways in which Proposition 13 and
the political mobilization behind it have shifted the narrative
surrounding expectations of government and the willingness of
citizens to fund government services. 82
A similar phenomenon occurred nationwide: throughout
the 1970s, a number of states passed similar initiatives, and by
1980, thirty-eight states had reduced or stabilized their tax
bases through laws similar to Proposition 13.83 In the same
year, Ronald Reagan won the presidency on a campaign heavily
reliant on anti-tax rhetoric. 84 The tide against taxation
extended into the 1990s, informing President Bill Clinton's
1996 announcement that "the era of big government is over";85
the subsequent Clinton-Republican Congressional agreement
to reform welfare in 1996; and the so-called "Bush tax cuts" to
federal income and estate taxes in 2001.86 Over the course of
this revolt, anti-tax sentiment has increased dramatically
while the level of taxation has become a much more salient
political issue among both voters and politicians. 87
Although politicians from both parties have become
increasingly opposed to tax increases, the Republican Party has
become ardently anti-tax in its rhetoric and policies over the
last several decades, having "decided to make a war on taxes
the center of their political agenda continuously from the late
82. See, e.g., Jack Citrin, Introduction: The Legacy of Proposition 13, in
CALIFORNIA AND THE AMERICAN TAX REVOLT: PROPOSITION 13 FIVE YEARS LATER
1, 20 (Terry Schwadron & Paul Richter eds., 1984) ("Proposition 13 ushered in an
era of tax relief during which many states legislated reductions and others
eschewed the increase that would have been required for government to continue
to expand."); Jack Citrin & Frank Levy, From 13 to 4 and Beyond: The Political
Meaning of the Ongoing Tax Revolt, in California, in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT:
THE CASE OF PROPOSITION 13, at 18 (George G. Kaufman & Kenneth T. Rosen
eds., 1981) ("An immediate consequence of Propsition 13's overwhelming victory
was to elevate tax and spending limitation to a status previously accorded such
symbols of virtue as motherhood and the flag."); ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE
PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
POLITICS 112 (2008) (arguing that Proposition 13 "altered the balance of power"
by empowering conservative interest groups that had previously sat out tax
protests "to see that it was possible to limit taxation-if they were willing to focus
on the property tax").
83. David Lowery & Lee Sigelman, Understanding the Tax Revolt: Eight
Explanations, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963, 963 (1981).
84. Kornhauser, supra note 80, at 913.
85. CNN Transcript of President Clinton's Radio Address, CNN (Jan. 27,
1996, 11:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/960ibudget/01-27/clinton-radio/,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZG3N-YJAW.
86. Kornhauser, supra note 80, at 913.
87. Id. at 913, 923.
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1970s down to the 2008 election when John McCain promised
to make George W. Bush's tax cuts permanent.188 The
Republican Party Platform has long supported fiscal
conservatism, but in recent election years, the party's platform
has devoted increasing attention to warnings about the
dangers of taxation and the necessity of reducing taxes while
increasingly characterizing taxation in a wholly negative
light. 89 This is epitomized by the widespread willingness over
the past several decades of Republicans to agree to the Grover-
Norquist-led Americans for Tax Reform's Taxpayer Protection
Pledge that opposes all tax increases. 90 Since the Pledge was
created in 1986, it has been signed by over 1,100 state
officeholders as well as 219 representatives and 39 senators of
the 113th Congress. 91 As Americans for Tax Reform proudly
explains, "the pledge has become de rigueur for Republicans
seeking office, and is a necessity for Democrats running in
Republican districts."92 In recent years, conservative members
of Congress have even gone so far as to advocate repeal of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution,93 which ushered in
the federal income tax.94
88. Block, supra note 79, at 72.
89. Compare Archive of Political Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform
of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php
?pid=25842 (last visited Aug. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ T2CR-896Z
(using language such as "[tiaxes and government spending are inseparable....
Only if the taxpayers' money is prudently managed can taxes be kept at
reasonable levels" and 57 uses of the word tax and its compounds), with Archive of
Political Party Platforms, Republican Party Platform of 2008, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545 (last visited
Aug. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6U3P-64JD (100 uses of the word "tax"
and its compounds), and REPUBLICAN PLATFORM OF 2012, available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101961 (last visited Sept. 1,
2014), archived at http:// perma.cc/4357-KNN6 (using language such as "[t]axes,
by their very nature, reduce a citizen's freedom" and 97 total references to the
word "tax" and its compounds).
90. AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, FEDERAL TAXPAYER PROTECTION PLEDGE, 113TH
CONGRESSIONAL LIST, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/atrfiles/files/files/
121012-113thCongress.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P2MW-LRH9.
91. Id.
92. About the Taxpayer Protection Pledge, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.
atr.org/federal-taxpayer-protection-questions-answers-a6204 (last visited Aug. 22,
2014), archived at http:/ perma.cc/3PGL-9A93.
93. See, e.g., Fair Tax Act of 2011, H.R. 25, 112th Cong. (2011).
94. Prior to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
had famously ruled that any national tax administered by the federal government
and assessed in a manner not directly proportionate to a state's population was
unconstitutional. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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The emergence of a broad anti-tax sentiment among
conservatives, as we discuss below, shifts the structural
incentives for the Republican Party in negotiations of budget
making. Coupled with the political polarization we describe in
the next section, this anti-tax sentiment encourages fiscally
conservative Republicans to participate in game-of-chicken-
style negotiations, since they have reduced incentives to make
fiscal compromises, and it enhances the benefits to many
elected representatives of appearing to steadfastly oppose
anything other than broad-based tax cuts. 95
B. Increased Partisan Polarization
In addition to the rise of conservative anti-tax sentiment,
recent years have witnessed a dramatic rise in partisan
polarization, which has also contributed to the new fiscal
politics we identify. Rational choice analysis has long predicted
that in winner-take-all elections, candidates will tend to sort
themselves into two parties. This has been the case for most of
the history of the United States. 96 Yet party cohesion has
grown much stronger over the past several decades, 97 becoming
especially heightened with respect to fiscal issues. In just one
recent example, in April of 2011 the House voted almost
entirely along party lines to cut federal spending by $5.8
trillion over the proceeding decade and substantially alter the
structure of the federal Medicare program. 98 Not a single
95. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Debt Bill Is Signed, Ending a Fractious
Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/us/politics/
03fiscal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/DWU9-RPRA
('The difference is the intensity here,' said David R. Mayhew, a political science
professor at Yale. 'The Republicans have the Tea Party, and the Democrats don't
have anything of comparable animation on their side.' Democrats, hamstrung in
part by Congressional procedures and hewing to more traditional methods of
compromise and negotiation, allowed Republicans to pull the center of debate
much closer to their priorities.").
96. This is known as Duverger's Law. See William H. Riker, The Two-Party
System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science, 76 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 753 (1982) (summarizing political science research showing
Duverger's Law-that a plurality rule for selecting the winner of elections favors
a two-party system-is generally true, as rational choice theory would predict).
97. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAL J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS 44-51 (2012); Jacob S. Hacker, Yes We Can? The New Push for American
Health Security, 37 POL. SOC'y 3, 24-25 (2009),
98. Carl Hulse, House Approves Republican Budget Plan to Cut Trillions, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/us/politics/16congress
.html, archived at http://perma.ccfRAS8-3SSB.
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Democrat voted for the proposal while only four House
Republicans opposed it.99 According to the National Jurist, at
that point the 111th Congress of 2009-2010 was the most
polarized in history. 100 Just five House Republicans in 2010
generated vote ratings more liberal than the most conservative
House Democrat, and just four Democrats produced ratings
more conservative than the most liberal Republican. 101
At both the national and the state levels, this rising
polarization has been accompanied by the growing power of
political parties. During the middle decades of the 20th
century, party cohesion was at historically low levels. 102
Beginning with the presidency of Jimmy Carter and continuing
through the 1980s, however, party unity increased as the
incumbency advantage receded and the national political
climate increasingly affected local races. 103  The 1994
Congressional elections heralded the start of a new era of
party-centric politics; local votes depended more on national-
partisan identification, such that "personal opposition to gun
control or various other liberal policies no longer sufficed to
save Democrats in conservative districts." 104 As a result of
these new voting patterns, legislators' electoral fates have
become profoundly linked to their party's popularity;
distinguishing oneself from one's party has become less
valuable for a legislator while supporting party leadership has
become more valuable. 105 At the same time, increasingly
gerrymandered districts have reduced the number of truly
competitive congressional seats in the House-from 152 in the
1970s to 101 today-resulting in fewer moderate
representatives and a more polarized House membership. 10 6
99. Id.




102. See Patricia A. Hurley & Rick K. Wilson, Partisan Voting Patterns in the
U.S. Senate, 1877-1986, 14 LEG. STUD. Q. 225, 229-30 (1989).
103. Morris P. Fiorina, Parties as Problem Solvers, in PROMOTING THE
GENERAL WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 242
(Alan S. Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik, eds. 2007).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES, AND
PARTISANSHIP IN THE U. S. SENATE 188 (2009).
106. See BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., 2012 REDISTRICTING: WILL THE HOUSE BE
MORE POLARIZED THAN EVER? (2012), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/Redistricting__Report-format1ll-2.pdf, archived at http://perma
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Indeed, the 112th Congress has since surpassed the 111th
Congress as one of the most polarized in modern history. 107
It is perhaps worth noting that party polarization
contributing to government shutdowns is generally only a
problem in the United States, 10 8 because in parliamentary
democracies, negotiation failures rarely result in government
shutdowns. 10 9 Typically, the majority coalition either has
enough control to pass a budget or else a new election is called;
polarization rarely leads to complete inaction. 110 Thus, the
differences between the United States political system and
those of other democracies limit what we can learn from foreign
experiences. 1 1 1
In the United States, political polarization makes party-
line votes more likely because it eliminates overlap in the
political orientations of even relatively moderate members of
the Democratic and Republican parties. 112 Increases in party
polarization have led to a reduced number of moderate
lawmakers who might facilitate compromise between the
parties. 113 Partisan power makes party-line votes more likely,
.cc/9VC2-KRZB. In particular, gerrymandering by state legislatures in 2010
provided Republicans with significant advantages in carrying proportionally more
House seats in the 2012 election than would have been the case if seats had been
apportioned according to statewide votes for House candidates. Adam Serwer et
al., Now That's What I Call Gerrymandering!, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/1 l/republicans-gerrymandering-house-
representatives-election-chart, archived at http://perma.cc/5E3F-7R7V.
107. Dylan Matthews, It's Official: The 112th Congress Was the Most Polarized
Ever, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2013, 11:07 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.coml
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013101/17/its-official-the- 112th-congress-was-the-most-
polarized-ever, archived at http://perma.cc/4DYR-KK23.
108. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-AMFD-86-16,
APPROPRIATIONS: CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS AND AN ASSESSMENT OF AUTOMATIC
FUNDING APPROACHES 27 (1986), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/AF
MD -86-16, archived at http://perma.cc/H8ZK-RDY7.
109. See Katharine G. Young, Shutdown Exceptionalism: A Comparative
Constitutional Reflection on the 2013 Lapse in Appropriations (Nov. 16, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
1 10. See id. ("One possible explanation for the lack of experience could be that
many of these countries' governments are organized under the parliamentary
system.").
111. Id. at 26. Young has argued that structural aspects of the American
system-the legislative branch's dual responsibility to pass laws but also to check
and sometimes impede the executive branch, coupled with the absence of a fiscal
impasse resolution rule-leads to political dysfunction unique to the United
States.
112. See James M. Snyder & Tim Groseclose, Estimating Party Influence in
Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 193 (2000).
113. Political polarization need not express itself in terms of a
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because such a climate decreases any benefits of breaking from
the party line; the benefit of logrolling for district advantage
will be outweighed by the challenge a legislator may face at the
next primary election for appearing too willing to
compromise. 114 Indeed, partisan polarization is reflected in an
increasing percentage of representatives voting with their
party at the federal level; the percentage of representatives
voting with their party has increased over the last twenty
years. 115 As breaks within the party over individual votes
become rarer, such breaks become more notable and the
political downsides to legislators increase, leading ultimately to
increased polarization in roll call votes. 116 Empirical research
suggests that party influence is most demonstrable in budget
resolutions and tax policy matters. 117
Such party uniformity has come at the expense of
moderate incumbents who might wish to eschew party-line
politics. 118 A number of recent incumbent Republicans have
lost their campaigns for reelection not in the general election
Democrat/Republican split. However, as discussed below, over the past thirty-five
years polarization has increasingly been equated to interparty conflict. See NOLAN
M. MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND
UNEQUAL RICHES 3 (2008).
114. See Aaron Blake, The GOP's Biggest Sin: 'Unwilling to Compromise,
WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/
wp/2013/04/01/the-gops-biggest-sin-unwilling-to-compromise/, archived at http://
perma.cc/JYJ9-EJAQ ("[I]ndividual Republican members of Congress continue to
have plenty of incentive to hold firm and resist compromise. A recent Pew
Research Center survey found that Republican voters preferred principled stands
to compromise by a margin of 55 percent to 36 percent. And the vast majority of
Republican members have more to fear in their primaries than they do in the
general election.").
115. See Brett Gall, Politics by the Numbers: Proving the Partisan Divide, CTR.
FOR STUDY PRESIDENCY & CONGRESS (July 2, 2010), http://thecenterforthestudy
ofthepresidencyandcongress.wordpress.com/2010/07/02/politics-by-the-numbers-
proving-the-partisan-divide/, archived at http://perma.cc/F6TE-LRXH.
116. See, e.g., MCCARTYETAL., supra note 113.
117. See Snyder & Groseclose, supra note 112, at 202-03 ("Evidence of [party]
influence appears most frequently and steadily on large issues that have clearly
distinguished the parties... such as budget resolutions that set overall spending
priorities, tax policy, social security, social welfare policy, and the national debt
limit.").
118. For a general discussion of the demise of Republican moderates, see
Jonathan Chait, How the GOP Destroyed its Moderates, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 5,
2012), http://www.newrepublic.comlarticle/books-and-arts/magazine/108150/the-
revolution-eats-its-own#, archived at http://perma.cc/TW46-XCBP, as well as the
book it reviews, GEOFFREY KABASERVICE, RULE AND RUIN: THE DOWNFALL OF
MODERATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, FROM
EISENHOWER TO THE TEA PARTY (2012).
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but by losing their party primary to a far more right-wing
candidate. These upsets provide high-profile lessons in the
dangers of appearing too willing to compromise. 119 Recent
Senate incumbents who have lost their seats in a party
primary include Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, 120 one of
the longest-serving Republican senators at the time of his
loss; 12 1 Senator Robert F. Bennett of Utah; 122 Senator Arlen
Specter, forced to switch parties to avoid a widely-predicted
Republican primary loss; 123 and Senator Lisa Murkowski of
Alaska. 124 Only Murkowski would go on to retain her seat,
running as the first write-in candidate to win election to the
United States Senate since Senator Strom Thurmond in
1954.125 And in many places, especially the Deep South, most
Republican candidates who appear even occasionally to buck
the conservative line are put through purity test challenges in
119. See, e.g., Charlie Cook, The GOP's Primal Fear of Primaries, NAT'L J.
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/off-to-the-races/the-gop-s-primal-
fear-of-primaries-20140210, archived at http://perma.cc/T8JJ-ZQ9A ("Although a
certain amount of paranoia is natural for any elected official, it is particularly
prevalent now among Republicans, who are enmeshed in a civil war between the
Republican Party establishment and the GOP's tea-party/most conservative
elements."); Stephen Stromberg, Eric Cantor's Defeat Hurts the Country, WASH.
POST (June 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/
2014/06/1 1/eric-cantors-defeat-is-no-victory-for-democrats, archived at http://
perma.cc/H8BK-S3MS (Noting that even before House Majority Leader Eric
Cantor's shocking primary defeat in 2014, "Republicans already feared drawing
primary challenges for failing to be adequately doctrinaire, which explains a lot of
the dysfunction in Washington. For Republicans, the cautious move has been to
refuse compromise with Democrats.").
120. Monica Davey, Lugar Loses Primary Challenge in Indiana, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/us/politics/lugar-loses-primary-
challenge-in-indiana.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ESE3-LLNP.
121. Id.
122. Amy Gardner, Tea Party Wins Victory in Utah as Incumbent GOP Senator
Loses Bid for Nomination, WASH. POST (May 9, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.conmwp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/08/AR2010050803430.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/6B5K-GN7M.
123. Stephanie Condon, Arlen Specter Loses Pennsylvania Democratic Senate
Primary to Joe Sestak, CBS NEWS (May 19, 2010, 4:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.comlnews/arlen-specter-loses-pennsylvania-democratic-senate-primary-to-joe-
sestak, archived at http://perma.cc/6WDP-KSW2.
124. Linda Feldmann, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska Bows Out, Is Seventh Losing
Incumbent, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.comI
USA/Elections/Senate/2010/0901Lisa-Murkowski-of-Alaska-bows.out-is-seventh-
losing-incumbent, archived at http://perma.cc/MKV-7R8U.
125. Vauhini Vara, Murkowski Is Winner of Alaska Senate Race, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
18, 2010), httpJ/online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487046486045756208436771873
22.html, archived at httpJ/perma.cc/rE2E-R9RR.
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the primaries, 126 including, most recently, Senator Thad
Cochran of Mississippi, who narrowly won a run-off primary
contest. 127 Even the Party leadership is not immune: one
recent high-profile causality was Representative Eric Cantor of
Virginia, the sitting house majority leader, who lost his 2014
Republican primary election to a near-totally unknown Tea
Party-backed challenger. 128
Contemporary anti-tax sentiment among conservatives
coupled with the internal party pressure placed on moderates
to toe the party line at all costs decreases the likelihood of a
logrolling model of legislative negotiations. 129 In the neutral
environment, a legislator might be willing to trade her support
for something of interest to her. In the tax revolt environment,
her support will come at a much higher cost, if it comes at all.
The combination of the recent anti-tax movement among
conservative politicians and increased partisanship has thus
had three broad effects, which we identify as the new fiscal
politics: (i) bills involving any form of tax increases are, overall,
far less likely to pass, and where logrolling is still possible, it
will be more difficult and will require larger concessions; (ii)
budget negotiations are more likely to follow the game-of-
chicken model, such that default outcomes will more frequently
occur due to the higher costs associated with negotiated
compromise; and (iii) because of (i) and (ii), since fiscal policy
often lacks default outcomes, the threat of government
shutdowns is real, and their occurence not improbable. Sure
enough, this is precisely what we have seen in a number of
126. Jonathan Martin, One Party, Two Factions: South's Republicans Look a
Lot Like Its 1970s Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/03/us/politics/one-party-two-factions-souths-republicans-look-a-lot-like-
its- 1970s-democrats.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E6NZ-9BA5.
127. Donna Cassata & Emily Wagster Pettus, GOP Sen. Thad Cochran
Narrowly Defeats Tea Party Opponent, SALON (June 24, 2014, 9:30 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/06/25/gop-sen-thadcochrannarrowly-defeats-tea-pa
rty-opponent/, archived at http://perma.cc/5C89-5F6Y.
128. Jonathan Martin, Eric Cantor Defeated by David Brat, Tea Party
Challenger, in G.O.P. Primary Upset, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com20l4/06/11/us/politics/eric-cantor-loses-gop-primary.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/3BLM-L7DJ.
129. As a recent example, longtime moderate Republican Senator Olympia
Snowe of Maine declined to run for reelection in 2012, citing the increasingly
partisan environment. See Dana Bash & Paul Steinhauser, Citing Partisanship,
Maine's Snowe Says Shell Leave the Senate, CNN (Feb. 28, 2012, 8:36 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/28/politics/senate-snowe-retiring/index.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/3WHF-84QZ.
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recent and well-documented fiscal crises that have resulted
from the breakdown of negotiations over budget making. 130
C. The Limited Power of Voter Discipline
Exacerbating these components of the new fiscal politics is
the limited role that public opinion has played in altering
legislative behavior. This is due in part to several psychological
phenomena that influence perception and decision making,
including the isolation effect, 131 the priming effect, 132 and the
"identified victim effect."'133 Neuroscience and behavioral
economics research has shown that voters communicate
inconsistent and asymmetric preferences with respect to fiscal
policy. For example, when polled, voters often express
incoherent preferences, strongly supporting calls by politicians
to cut taxes even when the voters are equally opposed to
service cuts. 134
Because voters both generally express support for cutting
spending to balance the federal budget and oppose tax hikes, 135
politicians may be tempted to make cuts to particular programs
in order to accomplish this. Yet when individual programs are
identified for cutting, the same voters often express strong
130. See infra Part III.B.
13 1. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and
the Neglect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 289,
290 (2006) ("People know about indirect effects but do not consider them, or do not
consider them enough, when evaluating the attraction of the tax or other payment
mechanism ... [W]e follow others in calling this an isolation effect.").
132. See, e.g., Dennis Chong, Jack Citrin & Patricia Conley, When Self-Interest
Matters, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 541, 544 (2001) ("[P]eople are more likely to recognize
their own self-interest and to act upon it when ... they have been primed to think
about the personal costs and benefits of the policy.").
133. The identifiable victim effect is the psychological phenomenon whereby
people are more willing to expend resources to save an identifiable victim than an
equal number of unidentifiable victims. See, e.g., Karen E. Jenni & George
Loewenstein, Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
235 (1997); Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping
the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003).
134. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 106, 118 (2006); see also Block, supra note 79, at 68
("The [public's] ambivalence [about tax cuts] exists because people want both the
services that government provides and low personal tax burdens.").
135. See, e.g., Susan Welch, The "More for Less" Paradox: Public Attitudes on
Taxing and Spending, 49 PUB. OPINION Q. 310, 310 (1985) (describing widespread
research indicating that voters want both tax reductions and increased levels of
government services).
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disapproval of these cuts. 136 This "isolation effect" frequently
leads voters to support the abstract notion of budget cuts, but
then to oppose actual budget cuts once identifiable programs
are placed on the chopping block. 137 Thus, no politician or party
has a strong incentive to take the lead on making painful cuts
in services or on raising taxes, because any politicians who take
such initiative are likely to be looked upon unfavorably by
voters.
Likewise, although voters may be displeased with
dysfunctional budget negotiations and the threat or actuality of
a government shutdown, 138 this is just one of many issues that
voters face at the ballot box. While Congress as an institution
has seen historically low approval ratings, 139 voters continue to
approve of the work done by their individual representatives at
much higher rates. 140 Even when most representatives have
negative approval ratings, the combination of gerrymandered
districts and the advantages of incumbency lead to far fewer
incumbents losing than voter approval ratings would
predict. 141
Further reducing the disciplining power of voters is the
asymmetric nature of their responses. While a majority of
voters prefer compromise to negotiation failure, a sufficient
number of conservative anti-tax voters instead appear to
136. See DAVID 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR
NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA 60-72 (1982) (showing through original research that
even voters who strongly support tax cuts also often oppose concomitant cuts in
services which those tax cuts would necessitate).
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
138. See infra Part III.A.
139. For example, during the debt ceiling negotiations in July of 2011,
Congress reached a then-record low 18 percent approval rating. Frank Newport,
Congress' Approval Entrenched at 18% as Debt Talks Continue, GALLUP POLITICS
(July 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148439/Congress-Approval-
Entrenched-Debt-Talks-Continue.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/T82Q-ZUM9.
140. For example, a CBS News/New York Times Poll taken shortly after the
fiscal cliff negotiations in 2011 found that while only 6 percent of voters thought
most members of Congress deserved reelection, 33 percent felt their own
representative should be reelected. Low Marks for Congress, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16,
2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/CBSNYTPollCongress 0916
11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E5VM-S6DY.
141. Despite terribly low approval ratings for both Congress as a whole and
voters' own representatives, the 2012 general election saw only one incumbent
Senator and roughly two dozen incumbent Representatives defeated. Aaron
Blake, Congressional Incumbents Have a Very Good Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 7,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/11/07/congressional-
incumbents-have-a-very-good-day/, archived at http://perma.cc/62ZX-BF94.
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punish lawmakers who pursue a strategy of conciliation. As
discussed supra in Part II.B, a number of Republican
lawmakers perceived as too moderate have recently been voted
out in primaries or declined to seek reelection when faced with
a bitter primary fight. 142 This has only become more prominent
with the rise of the Tea Party's ardent anti-tax, budget-deficit
reduction platform. This, coupled with growing demand for
tighter party unity, 143  has put individual Republican
representatives under increasing pressure to oppose any tax
hike in any context. 144 And because party primaries are often
decided by ideologically extreme portions of the electorate, 145
many lawmakers have strong incentives to stand firm on
principle and avoid compromising rather than conciliate and be
perceived as a RINO (Republican in name only). 146 Thus, while
moderate and swing voters appear to disapprove of legislators
who fail to reach a compromise solution or who stake out
extreme positions, 147  because an increasing number of
legislators are in relatively safe districts, 148 they may have
more to gain by sticking to their party's position than seeking
compromise. Consequently, as we demonstrate further through
examples in the next Part, even when government shutdowns
are highly unpopular with the majority of voters, politicians
still have structural incentives to flirt with negotiation failure
142. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Alex Newman, Tea Party Activists Target GOP House Leaders,
NEW AM. (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/
item/5696-tea-party-activists-target-gop-house-leaders, archived at http:I/perma
.cc/83AR-AJDA.
145. See David W. Brady, Hahrie Han & Jeremy C. Pope, Primary Elections
and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 79 (2007) (finding that primary voters favor more ideologically extreme
candidates and that congressional candidates respond by positioning themselves
closer to the primary electorate than the general electorate).
146. See, e.g., DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, TELL NEWT TO SHUT
UP! 167-68 (1996). Maraniss and Weisskopf describe how, during the 1995-1996
government shutdowns, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Majority Leader
Tom DeLay felt they could not appear to compromise once the government
shutdown had begun. Id. The authors note that in response to a proposal to pass a
continuing resolution to reopen the government and restart negotiations, DeLay
was quoted as saying, "Our members will kill us!" Id.
147. See infra Part III.A.
148. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the
Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006). This, of
course, does not account for the United States Senate, elections to which remain
bound to historical state boundaries.
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anyway.
III. RECENT GAME-OF-CHICKEN BUDGET FAILURES
As several recent case studies below demonstrate, the
rising anti-tax sentiment among conservatives and the
structural consequences of increasing partisanship and
polarization have led to a number of game-of-chicken-style
negotiations over state and federal budgets in which neither
party blinked. Polling suggests that moderate, independent,
and swing voters dislike government shutdowns or even the
threat of government shutdowns, and may want to punish the
party viewed as taking too hard a line and being unwilling to
compromise to prevent a shutdown.149 In theory, then, despite
conditions which make game-of-chicken politics-and therefore
government shutdowns-more likely, we might think that
voters should be able to discipline lawmakers through the
democratic process by making their displeasure with these
outcomes known at the ballot box.
Yet as the following case studies make clear (and
bolstering the theoretical discussion in the previous Part) the
threat of popular disapproval has often been insufficient to
overcome the admixture of partisanship, anti-tax sentiment,
and structural incentives to engage in game-of-chicken-style
politics. Thus, absent concerted voter disciplining of legislators
and the executive, lawmakers today are frequently tempted to
walk right to the edge of a shutdown in order to extract
concessions knowing that even if neither party blinks, they are
unlikely to face serious personal consequences.
149. For example, an April 2011 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Survey found
that a large majority of Independents wanted party leaders in the House and
Senate to make compromises to gain consensus on the ongoing 2011 budget
debate; 76 percent wanted such compromise from the Democratic leadership and
66 percent from the Republican leaders. Mark Murray, Poll: Democrats Want
Compromise, Republicans Prefer Resolve, NBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011, 6:28 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42460168/ns/politics-white house/t/poll-democrats-
want-compromise-republicans-prefer-resolve/#.U8HNeEJdVo8, archived at http:/!
perma.cc/82E-PTVP. Likewise, a Gallup poll taken during the 2011 debt ceiling
negotiation indicated that 72 percent of Independents, as compared to 57 percent
of Republicans and 69 percent of Democrats, thought that lawmakers should
agree to a compromise, even if it was a plan which they disagreed with. Frank
Newport, Americans, Including Republicans, Want Debt Compromise, GALLUP
POLITICS (July 18, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148562/Americans-
Including-Republicans-Debt-Compromise.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/T4K6-
QEU2.
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To explore the role of public opinion in these game-of-
chicken negotiations, we briefly survey several of the most
prominent government shutdowns in recent years: the 1995-
1996 and 2013 federal government shutdowns, the 2008-2012
California budget crises, and the summer 2011 Minnesota state
government shutdown. Although we caution against
extrapolating too broadly from these case studies, in all but the
California examples, voters expressed more disapproval of the
Republican legislature than the Democratic executive
(President Clinton in 1995-1996, President Obama in 2013,
and Governor Mark Dayton in 2011).150
These case studies are thus largely consistent with a story
in which Republican legislators are often tempted to take an
increasingly hard line in budget negotiations. The most
ideologically conservative Republicans increasingly seem to be
less concerned about the consequences of government
shutdowns than are most Democrats and more moderate
Republicans. 151 As game-of-chicken models predict, when one
coalition knows that the other coalition is more averse to the
consequences of negotiation failure, the less-averse coalition
has incentives aggressively to press their position in
negotiations. 152 It should thus come as no surprise that voters
have blamed Republicans more than Democrats for many of the
recent government shutdowns, perceiving Republican
legislators as less willing to compromise. 153
All of the recent government shutdowns resulted in job
approval declining for the leadership of both parties.
Nevertheless, game-of-chicken-style budget negotiations
continue because, despite the unpopularity of government
shutdowns, partisan polarization makes compromise more
difficult, and neither party is willing to give in to all-or even
most-of the other party's demands.
These shutdowns are illustrative of the effects of the new
fiscal politics we have described above: although in every
shutdown all parties lose voter approval as a result of failing to
pass a budget, the short-term game-of-chicken incentives to
150. See infra Part III.A (providing case studies of each shutdown).
151. See infra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
153. See Lydia Saad, Americans' Top Critique of GOP: 'Unwilling to
Compromise' GALLUP POLITICS (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
161573/americans-top-critique-gop-unwilling-compromise.aspx, archived at http://
perma.cc/MD74-A4JP.
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refuse compromise and the absence of longer-term
consequences for negotiation failure have led to repeated
shutdowns. This is a problem, considering that government
shutdowns are costly, and even near shutdowns can have
negative effects due to the uncertainty they create. 154 Below,
we thus briefly discuss some of the consequences that have
stemmed from recent government shutdowns to demonstrate
why the threat of government shutdowns should be curtailed.
In addition, we explain why we believe the absence of default
budgets, coupled with the new fiscal politics, will likely lead to
future shutdowns.
A. Case Studies of Government Shutdowns
1. 1995-1996 Federal Government Shutdowns
The first modern major federal government shutdown took
place during the fall of 1995 and early winter of 1996.155 Given
the record Republican gains in the 1994 midterms led by
newly-elected Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and his
"Contract with America," many speculated that congressional
Republicans would enjoy popular support should a budget
dispute with President Clinton emerge. 156 Indeed, in the
months leading up to the fall 1995 government shutdown,
many expected a major game-of-chicken confrontation between
Gingrich and the Republican House leadership and President
Clinton over deficit reduction in the 1996 federal budget. 157
Ahead of the confrontation, both parties were confident that
voters would blame the other party's leadership for a possible
government shutdown. 158
154. See infra Part III.B.
155. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE
GINGRICH CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE 96-109 (1997) (describing
the sense of momentum among Congressional Republicans after the 1994
midterm elections and their push to implement their "Contract for America").
156. Id.
157. See MARANISS & WEISSKOPF, supra note 146, at 149.
158. David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf capture this dynamic in retelling
an encounter between then-House Majority Whip Tom Delay and Vice President
Al Gore in the lead-up to the 1995 government shutdown. See id. at 146. In
response to Delay's threat to shut down the government, Gore responded, "Our
polls show you guys lose if the government shuts down." Id. In contrast,
Republicans expected that their approach would "pay political dividends" by
"demonstrat[ing] their dedication to cutting the cost and size of the Federal
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Pressing their perceived advantage, congressional
Republicans sought to reduce dramatically the size of the
federal government over the course of 1995, seeking to cut
projected federal spending by $894 billion over seven years,
including billions in cuts to Medicare, Medicaid, entitlement
programs, and the earned income tax credit. 159 President
Clinton, refusing to pass a budget that would have gutted
many Democratically-backed social welfare programs, haggled
over differences with Republicans into the fall while the
government operated after October 1-the start of the new
fiscal year 160 -on a series of continuing resolutions set to
expire on November 13.161 When both President Clinton and
Congressional Republicans stood firm on their demands at the
expiration of the continuing resolutions, all but essential
government services shut down between November 13 and 19,
resulting in the furlough of an estimated 800,000 federal
workers.162 The parties reached a compromise on a temporary
spending bill on November 20, reopening the government until
December 15, but after President Clinton vetoed the budget-
reconciliation bill on December 6 and the parties could not
reach an agreement, the government shut down again on
December 15, this time idling over 260,000 workers. 163 This
shutdown, which lasted for 21 days between December 15, 1995
and January 6, 1996, was the longest shutdown in the federal
government's history and resulted in the furlough of roughly
284,000 federal employees and the nonpayment of an
additional 475,000 excepted federal employees who continued
to work throughout the shutdown. 164 The shutdown finally
ended when Clinton committed to balancing the federal budget
within seven years in exchange for a budget containing billions
Government." Adam Clymer, Big Risk for G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/111/llus/big-risk-for-gop.html, archived at http:/!
perma.cc/TTC7-ZDH8. Republicans anticipated the public would blame President
Clinton for vetoing their budgets without making a plausible case for how he
would balance the budget. Id.
159. GOP Throws Down Budget Gauntlet, 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-30, 2-31
(1995).
160. According to the Congressional Budget Process, the federal government's
fiscal year begins on October 1 of the prior calendar year. 2 U.S.C. § 631 (2012).
161. See CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 9 (2013).
162. Id.
163. See GOP Throws Down Budget Gauntlet, supra note 159, at 2-59, 2-62.
164. BRASS, supra note 161, at 9-10.
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less in cuts to Medicare and Medicaid than sought by
Republicans. 165 Despite the costly and embarrassing shutdown,
Clinton and Congressional Republicans "never closed the gap
on core policy questions, such as how far to go in overhauling
expensive health and welfare entitlements"166 -evidence of the
needless consequences associated with shutdowns that are
highly unlikely to bring about significant fiscal policy changes
worth their costs.
Both sides sought to frame the shutdowns as the product of
the other side's unreasonable behavior. 167 These moves were
accompanied by highly political rhetoric: in his message
accompanying the veto, Clinton labeled the Republican
proposal as one that was "extreme," and would "raise taxes on
millions of working men and women and their families" while
"provid[ing] a huge tax cut... [for] those who are already the
most well-off."'168 Vice President Al Gore accused Republicans
of having "not done their job" and trying "to make an end run
around the Constitution, around the normal procedures."'169
Gingrich blamed Clinton for a potential shutdown, 170 reasoning
that Clinton was responsible since he held the final veto power,
while the Republican Committee released an advertisement
claiming, "[T]he President spent $607 million and closed the
Washington Monument. It would have been cheaper to balance
the budget.' 7 1
Contrary to both parties' expectations, voters viewed all
parties involved in negotiations more negatively as a result of
the shutdown. Clinton's approval rating for his handling of the
165. Jerry Gray, A Chilly G.O.P. Response to Clinton's Budget Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 8, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com1996/01/08/us/battle-over-budget-
overview-chilly-gop-response-clinton-s-budget-plan.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/M8LJ-C2Z2.
166. Budget Talks Limp Into 1996, Then Collapse, 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-5
(1996).
167. Compare MARANISS & WEISSKOPF, supra note 146, at 147 ("Gingrich...
complained that the White House was making movement toward compromise
more difficult by labeling him and his troops 'extremists."'), with id. at 166
("Clinton placed the blame for the breakdown on the Republicans and said they
would be held responsible for shutting down the government again.").
168. WILLIAM J. CLINTON, VETO OF H.R. 2491, H.R. DOc. No. 104-141, at 1.
169. Nightline: Government Shutdown Battle (ABC television broadcast Nov.
13, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbhipages/frontline/shows/
clintonetc/1 1 131995.html, archived at http://perma.ccUN8H-XSXB).
170. DREW, supra note 155, at 311.
171. Nightline: Government Shutdown Battle, supra note 169.
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shutdown was a mere 48 percent, 172 Gingrich's an even more
meager 22 percent. 173 While 49 percent blamed Republicans in
Congress for the government shutdown, 26 percent also blamed
President Clinton, and 19 percent blamed both parties for the
shutdown. 174 Gingrich was especially pilloried: he reached a
record 65 percent disapproval rating during his budget battle
with President Clinton; 175 64 percent of Americans opposed his
reelection to the speakership the following term; 176 and 70
percent approved of his decision to step down as Speaker after
the November 1998 election. 177 Thus, while the public placed
the majority of the blame for the budget crisis and subsequent
shutdown on Gingrich and congressional Republicans, all
parties were viewed far less favorably. Voters felt that both
sides were trying to gain political advantage from the crisis,
with 36 percent accusing Clinton and 52 percent accusing
Republicans of doing so. 178
Despite widespread disapproval from the American public,
a costly and damaging government shutdown, and little to
show for delaying a budget agreement that was largely the
same as that proposed prior to the shutdown, political leaders
faced insufficient costs to avoid the shutdown and the
temptation of trying to extract concessions from the other party
by threatening-and enacting-such a shutdown.
2. 2013 Federal Government Shutdown
Like the 1995-1996 federal government shutdown, the
recent 2013 federal government shutdown stemmed from
brinksmanship and a negotiation stalemate between a
Democratic President and a Republican-led House of





175. Gary Langer, Gingrich as Speaker: Remembering When, ABC NEWS (Sept.




178. Alec Tyson, The Last Government Shutdown and Now: A Different
Environment, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-
tank/2013/09/30/the-last-government-shutdown-and-now-a-dfferent-
environment/, archived at http://perma.cc/B6E3-6KBD.
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Representatives. Much like the 1995-1996 shutdown, the
public reaction viewed all parties in a more negative light, but
the Republicans more so. Much of the lead-up to the shutdown
over the summer of 2013 centered on the Affordable Care Act,
with many congressional Republicans seeking to undermine
implementation of healthcare reform through strategic
defunding during budget negotiations. Just as we have
described above, many Republicans hoped to play a game of
chicken with the federal budget, "hop[ing] that the prospect of
a government shutdown would pressure Senate Democrats to
make even a symbolic concession to their demand for changes
in the Affordable Care Act, perhaps by agreeing to the repeal of
the medical-device tax intended to help fund the law." 179
Furthermore, many conservatives in the House also opposed
the necessary increase in the federal debt ceiling, which
Speaker of the House John Boehner had hoped to tie to delays
in the implementation of the ACA. 180 After the Democratic-led
Senate rejected a final budget proposal by House Republicans
that would have delayed the implementation of the ACA's
"individual mandate," and with the federal government lacking
appropriations into the new fiscal year, all non-essential
federal government employees and offices shut down on
October 1st, the first federal government shutdown in
seventeen years. 181
Ahead of the shutdown, some members of the Republican
Party were already gloating about it. Minnesota
Representative Michele Bachmann said she was "very excited"
about getting "exactly what we wanted," while Texas
Representative John Abney Culberson said, "It's wonderful...
[w]e're 100 percent united!"182 Many others expressed similar
179. Janet Hook & Kristina Peterson, Government Heads Toward Shutdown,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2013, 5:16 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304373104579105483307740074, archived at http://perma.cc/
6ATJ-R2HP.
180. See Janet Hook & Kristina Peterson, No Clear Path to Avoid Shutdown as
House GOP Stands Firm, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://online.wsj
.comlnews/articles/SB10001424052702303342104579099151237112452, archived
at http://perma.cc/42QV-QH8V.
181. Lori Montgomery & Paul Kane, Senate Rejects House Amendments to
Spending Bill as Shutdown Looms, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/washington-braces-for-the-first-shutdown-of-the-
national-government-in-17-years/2013/09/30/977ebca2-29bd- 11e3-97a3-ff2758228
523_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/72C2-JYJE.
182. Ed O'Keefe & Rosalind S. Helderman, On Cusp of Shutdown, House
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
sentiments about the desirability of the shutdown. 183
Nevertheless, others, such as California Representative Devin
Nunes, warned that Democrats would likely benefit from a
shutdown that would hurt the Republican Party, 184 arguing
that it was "moronic" to shut down the government over a
dispute regarding the ACA. 185 New York Representative Peter
T. King concluded that House Republicans were locked in "the
dead end that Ted Cruz created." 186 Democrats largely sought
to cast the looming shutdown as resulting from the
Republicans' inappropriate overreaching: Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid flatly stated that "[w]e are not going to be
bullied," and President Obama argued that "[y]ou don't get to
extract a ransom for doing your job." 187
Once again, the shutdown negatively affected voters' views
of all government leadership. 188 According to a Gallup poll
taken during the shutdown, Americans had a record-low
satisfaction with the way the nation was being governed, with
only 18 percent of respondents satisfied and 81 percent
dissatisfied, the worst assessment in the over-forty-year history
of the Gallup poll. 189 In addition, the favorability ratings of
both President Obama and Speaker of the House John Boehner
declined dramatically during the shutdown: President Obama's
net favorability rating dropped from +10 to 0,190 and Boehner's
Conservatives Excited, Say They Are Doing the Right Thing, WASH. POST (Sept.
28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-cusp-of-shutdown-house-
conservatives-excited-say-they-are-doing-the-right-thing/2013/09/28/2a5ab618-
285e-1le3-97e6-2e7cadlb77e-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/69K5-
27BG.
183. See Svati Kirsten Narula, Ryan Jacobs & Judith Ohikuare, 32
Republicans Who Caused the Government Shutdown: Meet the House Conservative
Hardliners, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2013, 4:46 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/ 2013/10/32-republicans-who-caused-the-government-shutdown/280236/,
archived at http://perma.cc/32EZ-4YKN.
184. See Hook & Peterson, supra note 179.
185. Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in
Budget Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/




188. See Joy Wilke, Americans' Satisfaction With U.S. Gov't Drops to New Low,
GALLUP POLITICS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll165371/americans-
satisfaction-gov-drops-new-low.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/N7A4-ULUR.
189. Id.
190. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Down on D.C. Leaders Since Shutdown
Began, GALLUP POLITICS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165362/
americans-down-leaders-shutdown-began.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/7M37-
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from -10 to -24.191 Boehner's net favorability rating hit a new
low during the shutdown. 192 Further, the Republican Party's
favorability dropped 10 percentage points in the month leading
up to the shutdown, to a record-low 28 percent favorability in
the twenty-year history of the poll. 193 An NBC News/Wall
Street Journal poll found that while 31 percent of those polled
blamed President Obama for the shutdown, 53 percent blamed
Republicans in Congress. Seventy percent said Republicans
were putting politics ahead of what was best for the country,
while 51 percent said the same about President Obama. 194
In total, the shutdown lasted sixteen days until the
Treasury warned that it was less than a day away from
defaulting on its obligations.195 With the danger of a
government default looming, enough moderate Republicans in
the House and Senate voted to end the shutdown and fund the
government into early 2014, averting a default on the national
debt. 196 Unfortunately, as we described in Part II, above, even
widespread dissatisfaction with government shutdowns does
not necessarily translate into effective voter disciplining of
politicians, because both parties-and especially the
Republican Party-are increasingly driven by the more
partisan segments of their membership. Indeed, three months
after the 2013 shutdown, a Washington Post/ABC News poll
showed that Republican voters supported the Tea Party at the
same rate after the shutdown as before it, signaling that even
as a majority of Americans disapproved of the Republican
tactics that led to the shutdown, the core GOP constituency




193. Andrew Dugan, Republican Party Favorability Sinks to Record Low,
GALLUP POLITICS (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.comnpoll/165317/republican-
party-favorability-sinks-record-low.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/99JH-KHY3.
194. Cathleen Decker, NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll Adds to Republican
Shutdown Woes, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), http:larticles.latimes.com2013/oct/
11/news/la-pn-nbc-wsj-poll-republican-shutdown-20131011, archived at http:I
perma.cc/6PXH-M7EA.
195. Jonathan Weisman, Senators Restart Talks as Default Looms, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/politics/congress-budget-
debate.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3MR4-JNLT.
196. Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending
Crisis Over Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com]2013/10/17/us/congress-budget-debate.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/HD3H-Y2GN.
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3. 2008-2010 California Shutdowns
California's budget crises are particularly exemplary of the
new fiscal politics, given the prolonged length of California's
crises, the highly partisan climate in which budget negotiations
took place, and the repeated failure to pass a budget on time.
California's dysfunctions, like those of the federal government,
have resulted from the highly polarized nature of the state
legislature. Although Democrats have generally held majorities
in both the California Senate and State Assembly, 198
Democratic legislators regularly struggled during this period to
achieve the two-thirds supermajority necessary to increase
taxes and pass a budget, and thus the support of at least some
Republicans was crucial to California's fiscal policy. 199 Much
197. See Jaime Fuller, What Shutdown? New Poll Shows Tea Party Support
Remains Steady, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
blogs/the-fixlwp/2014/01/28/what-shutdown-new-poll-shows-tea-party-support-
remains-steady/, archived at http://perma.cc/KW57-FMVY.
198. See Adam Nagourney, With a Supermajority, California Democrats Begin
to Make Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com2012/12/17/
us/politics/for-california-democrats-supermajority-is-a-new-challenge.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/EFX6-N4S6 (noting that while the Democratic Party
has controlled the California Legislature in a nearly unbroken stretch over the
past 40 or so years, it only recently achieved a supermajority).
199. Until 2011, California's Constitution required a supermajority of two-
thirds of lawmakers in both houses to pass a budget, and while the Democrats
held large majorities in both houses, they could not surpass this supermajority
without Republican support. Assembly and Senate Republicans regularly vowed
to vote against any budget that included tax increases, and instead proposed a bill
that would implement an automatic state spending cap based on population
growth and inflation rates. Matthew Yi, Latest Gambit in State Budget Impasse,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 15, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/
article/Latest-gambit-in-state-budget-impasse-3273148.php, archived at http://
perma.cc/5U9N-AVA7.
In November 2010, voters approved Proposition 25, which reduced the
requirements to pass the budget to a simple majority and permanently docked
legislators' pay for each day the budget was late. Wyatt Buchanan & Justin
Berton, Prop. 25, Which Eases Budget Process, Passes, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/1 1/02/MNGN1G2HVF.DTL,
archived at http://perma.c/ZDX9-XLW2. However, voters also passed Proposition
26, which requires two-thirds approval for many fees that previously required a
majority vote. Id. As a result, any time the state legislature seeks to increase
taxes or fees, it must achieve the same supermajority to do so. This effectively
means that in periods of budget deficits-which are all too common in recent
years-any attempt to balance the budget through more than just budget cuts will
require the same supermajority as before.
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like the national Republican Party, California Republicans
have manifested increasingly unified opposition to any form of
tax increases. 200 Individual Republicans who join Democrats to
vote for tax increases often become subject to intense
conservative backlash. For example, when six Republicans
known as the Sacramento Six voted with Democrats on a
budgetary bill in February 2009, three faced organized recall
efforts, and the state Republican Party froze campaign support
to all six. 20 1 Whatever incentives these legislators might have
had to compromise in the face of voter disapproval, they faced
stronger threats of party and primary discipline to discourage
compromising.
In 2008, the California Legislature and Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger took a then-record eighty-five days beyond the
annual June 15 deadline to sign the next year's budget, 20 2 in
what political scientist Larry Gerston called "by far the worst"
budget impasse in thirty years. 20 3 As a cash-savings measure
while California went without a working budget, Governor
Schwarzenegger ordered pay cuts for thousands of state
workers to the federal minimum wage of $6.55 and layoffs of
more than 10,000 employees. 20 4 After state Controller John
Chiang refused the Governor's order, Schwarzenegger sued
Chiang, ordering him to slash their pay.20 5 The Governor also
delayed payments to nursing homes, community colleges, and
state vendors, among others. 206
200. See CAL. REPUBLICAN PARTY, CALIFORNIA REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM
2012-2016, at 9 (2012), available at http://www.cagop.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/05/2012-2016-Platform.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BG7P-3B2H ("We
call upon our government officials to join a pledge to stand together against any
new taxes.").
201. Martin A. Sullivan, California's Epic Budget Struggle, TAX NOTES, July
29, 2009, at 212.
202. Kevin Yamamura, Schwarzenegger Signs Record-Late State Budget,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 23, 2008, 10:23 AM), http://www.ezpolicyblog.com/file/
080923_SacBee_103bil.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8T3E-UFR7.
203. Matthew Yi, State Budget Impasse Looks Poised to Worsen, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 11, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/State-
budget-impasse-looks-poised-to-worsen-3200151.php, archived at http://perma.cc/
WH2R-96ZL.
204. Matthew Yi, Governor Sues Controller to Force Pay Cuts, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 12, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Governor-
sues-controller-to-force-pay-cuts-3199879.php, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZZT-
Y3DZ.
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State Budget (Sept. 16, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.latimes.coml
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Legislators finally agreed on a budget seventy-eight days
after the July 1 start of the fiscal year. 20 7 Additional revenue
was gained primarily by increasing individual withholdings
during the first half of the next calendar year and frontloading
quarterly tax payments by individuals and businesses, 20 8 as
well as by making reductions in deductions for corporate
taxpayers. 20 9 These temporary solutions mostly consisted of
accounting gimmicks to borrow time, rather than genuine
efforts to raise long-term revenues, as Democratic lawmakers
were constrained from raising revenues by Republicans
opposed to any form of tax increases. 210 Indeed, Governor
Schwarzenegger threatened to veto this budget proposal,
calling it "a fake budget reform."211 Then, faced with the
prospect that the legislature could override his veto,
Schwarzenegger also threatened to veto any future bill that
would require generating additional revenue. 212
Negotiations over the 2010-2011 budget were also stalled
down to the wire, and by July, Governor Schwarzenegger once
again sought to reduce state workers' salaries to the minimum
wage, this time rebuffed by a state judge.213 Schwarzenegger
was again blocked by the courts when he sought to furlough
state workers. 214 Lawmakers and the Governor finally reached
an agreement in early October--one hundred days after the
deadline-that included $3.5 billion in cuts to public education
and public employee pensions. It also employed yet more
news/local/la-me-budget 17-2008sep 17-transcript,0,5758192.story, archived at
http://perma.cc/QUD7-8KEU).
207. Matthew Yi, Budget Approved Despite Governor's Threatened Veto, S.F.
CHRON. (Sept. 16, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Budget-
approved-despite-governor-s-threatened-veto-3194573.php, archived at http://
perma.cc/7REL-5ZAX.
208. Id.
209. Matthew Yi, Legislature Approves Record-late Budget, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
20, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/article[Legislature-
approves-record-late-budget-3194254.php, archived at http:lperma.ccHYZ3-
YG6E.
210. Id.
211. Schwarzenegger, supra note 206.
212. Id.
213. Jennifer Steinhauer, On State Pay Cuts, Judge Rebuffs California
Governor, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.comI2010/07/17/
us/politics/17minimum.html#, archived at http:/lperma.cc/H345-T8BL.
214. Marisa Lagos, Governor Appeals Judge's Furlough Ruling, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 11, 2010, at C4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Governor
-appeals-judge-s-furlough-ruling-3178946.php, archived at http://perma.cc/L2UZ-
VGSL.
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accounting gimmicks, such as deferrals on payments and
optimistic but unrealistic revenue projections. 215 Just days
before the governor and legislature agreed to a budget, a public
opinion poll found that a record-low 10 percent of registered
voters approved of the job the legislature was doing, with 80
percent disapproving.216 Likewise, Governor Schwarzenegger,
just months from leaving office, also hit an all-time-low 23
percent approval rating. 217
Empirical research on California's political process
supports our proposition that many of the structural features of
the new fiscal politics are responsible for budget delays and
negotiation breakdowns. A recent study found that divided
government and party polarization appear to be the main
political-environment variables that drive gridlock.
218
4. 2011 Minnesota Shutdown
Another recent state-government shutdown occurred
during the summer of 2011 in the state of Minnesota. 2 19 While
Democratic Governor Mark Dayton narrowly won election on a
platform of preserving state services by increasing taxes on the
richest 2 percent of Minnesotans, Republicans recaptured the
legislature for the first time in thirty-eight years on a pledge of
no new taxes. 220 Such seemingly contradictory election results
215. Adam Nagourney, California Lawmakers Pass Overdue Budget, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2O10/10/O8/us/08california.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y9RJ-XSAA.
216. Wyatt Buchanan, Field Poll: Legislature Sinks to All-Time Low, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 28, 2010, at C3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/
Field-Poll-Legislature-sinks-to-all-time-low-3173029.php, archived at http://perma
.cc/W7NL-VNNX.
217. Id.
218. Jeff Cummins, An Empirical Analysis of California Budget Gridlock, 12
ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 23 (2012). Cummins notes that another source of gridlock is
the inherent instability of relying primarily on a state income tax to raise
revenue, since (not infrequent) economic downturns and booms lead to sudden
and unpredictable fluctuations in state revenue. For additional discussion of the
role of California's tax mix, see David Gamage, Coping Through California's
Budget Crises in Light of Proposition 13 and California's Fiscal Constitution, in
PROPOSITION 13 AT 30, at 51 (Jack Citrin & Isaac Martin eds., 2009).
219. See Rachel Weiner, Minnesota Government Shuts Down, WASH. POST
(July 1, 2011, 9:34 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-flx/post/
minnesota-government-shuts-down2011/07/01/AGvBVTtHblog.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/KR6X-V4LM.
220. See Baird Helgeson et al., Broken Deals, Bitter Words and a State Shuts
Down, STAR TRIB. (July 1, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/
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are all too possible with highly gerrymandered districts,
asymmetric voter preferences, and a high degree of partisan
polarization. As a result, the Governor and state legislature
faced a stalemate over how to address the state's $5 billion
budget deficit in light of decreasing state revenue. Republicans
proposed state spending cuts, layoffs for some state workers
and teachers, the delay of $700 million in payments to public
schools (which were already owed roughly $1 billion by the
state), and borrowing ahead of tobacco settlement payments to
the state. 221
In an exemplary display of game-of-chicken politics, state
Republicans also sought to include anti-abortion and voter ID
measures in the appropriations bill-measures they had been
unable to pass as separate bills-hoping Dayton would feel
forced to pass their version of the bill rather than risk a
shutdown. 222 Dayton countered by proposing a tax increase on
the wealthiest 2 percent of Minnesota taxpayers. 223 As game-
of-chicken modeling would predict, neither party appeared
willing to compromise. When the parties could not come to an
agreement by June 30, all non-emergency services of the state
government of Minnesota officially shut down. 224 Twenty-three
thousand of roughly 36,000 state employees were
furloughed,225 and only critical functions and constitutionally-
mandated programs were permitted to continue operation, as
determined by Ramsey County District Court Judge Kathleen
R. Gearin. 226 In total, the shutdown lasted twenty days from
July 1 to July 20.227 The shutdown ended when Governor
statelocal/124824189.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HV7S-YJ2N; Martiga Lohn
& Amy Forliti, Minnesota Government Shutdown 2011: Budget Deal Unreached,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2011, 10:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011
/07/01/minnesota-government-shutdown-2011_n_888418.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/KXR5-N83T.
221. See Helgeson et al., supra note 220.
222. David Bailey, Minnesota Government Shutdown Begins After Talks Fail,
REUTERS (July 1, 2011, 7:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2O11/07/01lus-





226. Order Granting Motion for Temporary Funding at 7, In Re Temporary
Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota, No.
62-CV-11-5203 (2d Dist. Ct. Minn. June 29, 2011).
227. Monica Davey, Minnesota Governor Signs Budget, Ending Shutdown,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
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Dayton and the Republican legislature agreed to the deferred
payments to public schools and borrowing ahead of tobacco-
company payments in exchange for no tax increase and the
removal of anti-abortion and voter ID measures. 228
Once again, the prospect of strong voter disapproval was
insufficient incentive for either party to give in and avoid a
shutdown. In the aftermath of the shutdown, voters appeared
to blame the Republican legislature more than Governor
Dayton, but the approval ratings of both fell. 229 According to a
MinnPost poll, 42 percent of respondents blamed the
Republicans in the legislature, 21 percent blamed Governor
Dayton, and 22 percent blamed both equally.230 Likewise, a St.
Cloud University survey found that 57 percent of respondents
blamed Republicans for the shutdown, 19 percent blamed
Governor Dayton, and 18 percent blamed both.23 1
B. The Harms of Shutdowns (and Near Shutdowns)
Each of these negotiation failures, in the absence of default
budgets, has led to government shutdowns. These are costly to
public sector employees, government contractors, and the
public at large. Even very short government shutdowns can
have significant consequences and diminish the quality of
public functions and services. Moreover, even when
government shutdowns are averted at the last minute, the
uncertainty surrounding unstable budget negotiations itself
creates harmful consequences. Uncertainty about the future of
the federal and state budgets and the stability of government
taxing and spending can harm economic growth, investor
2011/07/2 1/us/2 lminnesota.html, archived at http://perma.cc/58T2-YZNE.
228. See Michael A. Fletcher & Rachel Weiner, Minnesota Governor, GOP
Lawmakers Agree to End Shutdown, WASH. POST (July 14, 2011), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/economy/governor-gop-lawmakers-agree-to-end-
shutdownl2011/07/14/gIQAPlbrEIstory.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5EQ-
UFDV.
229. Eric Black, MinnPost Poll: Minnesotans Blame GOP for Shutdown,
MINNPOST (July 28, 2011), http://www.minnpost.com/politics.policy/2011/07/
minnpost-poll-minnesotans-blame-gop-shutdown, archived at http://perma.cc/
6BBS-LVAZ.
230. Id.
231. SAINT CLOUD ST. UNIV. SURVEY, ANNUAL MINNESOTA STATEWIDE SURVEY
FALL 2011, FINDINGS REPORT, available at http://www.scribd.comldoc/
72353118/Fall-Findings-Sfrank-Version-11-10, archived at http://perma.cc/3RX7-
52P6.
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confidence in federal debt and state and municipal bonds, and
the public's faith in government more generally.
Both of the recent federal government shutdowns are
paradigmatic of the direct costs of shutdowns. The 1995-1996
shutdowns were estimated to cost $1.4 billion in direct revenue
losses. 232 In the wake of the 2013 federal government
shutdown, the Office of Management and Budget reported that
the federal government shutdown would lower fourth quarter
GDP growth by between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points, or
between $2 and $6 billion in lost output,233 with private
analysts estimating over $3 billion in lost output.234
Shutdowns are also expensive because either government
employees go without a salary for the period of the shutdown,
or their retroactive pay once government restarts effectively
forces the government to pay for employees who were unable to
do any work. The 2013 federal government shutdown, for
example, cost the government approximately $2.5 billion in
total compensation for furloughed employees who did not work
during the shutdown, an estimated loss of over 6.6 million days
of work.235 Shutdowns are also costly for employees: the 1995-
1996 government shutdowns cost nearly $1.1 billion in wages
to furloughed workers, 236 and the 2011 Minnesota government
shutdown cost Minnesota state employees $65 million in lost
income because the agreement between Governor Dayton and
the legislature did not include a back-pay provision. 237
The budget crises in California were also indicative of
another consequence of budget negotiation failure in the
absence of defaults: reputation loss. In response to the state
controller's issuance of I.O.U.s--or warrants-in lieu of
payments (a gimmick that the National Conference of State
232. Richard A. Gephardt, The Congressional Budget Impasse, 16 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 5, 11 (1996).
233. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, IMPACTS AND COSTS OF THE OCTOBER 2013
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2 (2013).
234. Annie Lowrey & Michael D. Shear, Shutdown to Cost U.S. Billions,
Analysts Say, While Eroding Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2013, at A12,
available at http://www.nytimes.con2013/10/19/us/shutdown-to-cost-us-billions
analysts-say-while-eroding-confidence.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/
RW9R-T54V.
235. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 233, at 4.
236. Id. at 13.
237. MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET, STATE GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 4 (2011), available at http://www.mn.gov/mmb/images/2011-shutdown-
report%25200ctober%25202011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DZ77-YHQG.
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Legislatures reported was unprecedented by any American
state government), 238  Fitch Ratings cut its rating of
California's general obligation debt from A+ to BBB, two
notches above junk status.239
Shutdowns also affect the provision of state and federal
services to the public. In general, each shutdown will uniquely
curtail government functions depending on administrative and
judicial findings regarding essential services coupled with any
court orders to maintain particular operations. However,
shutdowns have typically affected public health; law
enforcement and public safety; the operation of state and
national parks, monuments, and museums; licensing and
registration functions; and (at the federal level) visa and
passport provisions, veterans' affairs, and American Indian
tribes. 240 The 2013 federal government shutdown led to a $4
billion backlog in IRS tax refunds. 24 1 The backlogs created can
affect service provision for years. CBS News reported that as of
October 2012-well over a year after the Minnesota
shutdown-driver's license applicants in Minnesota needed to
show up by 4 a.m. to wait in line for a driver's test or else face
scheduling delays of up to two months, delays attributed to the
government shutdown that occurred over a year prior.242
Shutdowns also delay work with government contractors
on infrastructure and building projects. These delays can drive
up costs or lead to a quagmire of lost-work claims filed by
contractors, and they hurt small and medium-sized businesses
that may rely on government contracts for a substantial
portion of their business. 243 When shutdowns loom, these
238. Jennifer Steinhauer, Coffers Empty, California Pays With LO.U.'s, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/us/
03calif.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WL69-XXGT.
239. Closer to Junk: Fitch Cuts California Debt Rating, DEALBOOK (July 7,
2009, 7:06 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/O7/O7/just-above-junk-fitch-
cuts-california-debt-rating, archived at http://perma.cc/A86P-JM29.
240. For a list of services furloughed during the 1995-1996 federal government
shutdown, see KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-844, SHUTDOWN OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND PROCESS 4-5 (2004).
241. OFFICE OFMGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 233, at 21.
242. Arrive At 4 A.M Or Wait 2 Months For Driver's License Test, CBS MINN.
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/l0/17/arrive-at-4-a-m-or-wait-
2-months-for-drivers-license-test/, archived at http://perma.cc/YT9A-GAED.
243. Elizabeth Williamson, Government Contractors Brace for Shutdown,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2748704587004576241033511757282.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7QA5-
CX8K.
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contractors and their employees must speculate whether they
will be furloughed or allowed to continue; this alone is costly.244
If they are furloughed, they must go without pay and must
litigate if they wish to seek back pay.245  Sometimes,
particularly with weather-sensitive highway projects, these
projects are then delayed into the following season, assuming
the appropriation will roll over into the following year. One
such "interruption of work was so severe that it threaten[ed]
the survival" of local contracting businesses in Minnesota. 246
More often than not, negotiation failures are temporary
and political leaders reach last-minute agreements to prevent
actual government shutdowns. Yet the uncertainty
surrounding last-minute budget deals and the risk of
government shutdowns is arguably more harmful than the
actual shutdowns themselves. Even when shutdowns are
averted, budget negotiations under the game-of-chicken model
still tend to delay the forging of budget compromises, and often
result in temporary policy extensions and midnight agreements
sometimes literally minutes before the deadline. The resulting
uncertainty over the contents of the final budget-and whether
there will even be one-frequently diminishes the effectiveness
of public functions even in the absence of an actual shutdown.
This is because fiscal policymaking necessarily requires some
degree of certainty about the future.247 Without knowing how
funds will be appropriated, public sector managers face
difficulties in planning for contingencies, as do government
244. Stacy Cowley, Government Shutdown Threat Paralyzes Contractors, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 7, 2007, 2:02 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/07/technology/
government contractorsshutdownlindex.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/622J-
CHV2.
245. Pat Doyle, Cost of Minnesota Government Shutdown Still Climbing, STAR
TRIB. (Jan. 26, 2012, 7:49 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/
138169549.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7TQN-UTV2 (describing "the
escalating cost of claims by highway contractors for lost work").
246. Id. (noting the "magnifying effect" the shutdown had on the progress of
large public works projects).
247. For a general discussion of the harms of budget uncertainty, see PHILIP G.
JOYCE, MARYLAND SCH. OF PUB. POL'Y, THE COSTS OF BUDGET UNCERTAINTY:
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF LATE APPROPRIATIONS (2012), available at http:/
faculty.publicpolicy.umd.edu/sites/default/files/oyce/files/thecosts of budget-unc
ertainty.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G2G2-58TB. For a general discussion of
the effects of instability and volatility in fiscal policy, see David Gamage,
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF.
L. REV. 749 (2010) [hereinafter Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises],
especially Part II.
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contractors and private sector actors who rely on public
functions. 248 Uncertainty also harms government contractors
and the private sector at large, 249 since it is difficult to plan
into the future when tax and budgetary decisions remain up in
the air. In addition, tax policy uncertainty also affects
taxpayers, who may be unsure year to year whether certain
deductions, credits, or rates will remain the same.
The harm created by budgetary uncertainty is exacerbated
in the public sector due to the incentives facing agencies in the
budgeting game.250 Because the budgets for public-sector
programs are set through the political process, public-sector
managers have incentives to demonstrate the need for as much
funding as possible in order to protect their budgets from cuts
to save programs elsewhere. Consequently, in response to real
or threatened funding cuts, public-sector managers may act so
as to make the impact of funding cuts as salient (and painful)
as possible for voters. 251
In addition to the direct harms of government shutdowns
and the harms that result from uncertainty, the conditions of
the new fiscal politics lead to the possibility that budgetary
outcomes may not always reflect preferences closest to the
median voter. This is because these conditions distort the
parties' relative bargaining power. 252 As discussed previously,
bargaining power under the game-of-chicken model partially
depends on the extent to which each party fears the
consequences of failure to reach an agreement. 253 When one
party believes more in the value of government programs and
is more concerned about the welfare of government employees
and program beneficiaries, that party will tend to have more
cause to fear the consequences of a government shutdown. In
248. Late State Budgets, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEG. (Aug. 27, 2010), http:II
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/late-state-budgets.aspx, archived at http://
perma.cc/ZU89-VKUS [herinafter NCSL Late State Budgets] ('Vithout
appropriation bill details, state agencies and local governments, including school
districts, are unable to budget, plan or deal effectively with their contractual
obligations leading to secondary and tertiary costs to overall government
operations.").
249. See, e.g., Geoff Colvin, Business's Real Problem: Uncertainty, Uncertainty,
Uncertainty, FORTUNE .(Aug. 8, 2012, 9:00 AM), httpJ/management.fortune.cnn.cori/
2012/08/08/business-economic-uncertainty/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8HQ-VCJH.
250. See Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises, supra note 247, at 789.
251. Id.
252. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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American fiscal politics, this has generally been the Democratic
Party, and as a result, the Republican Party enjoys a structural
advantage when budget negotiations resemble the game-of-
chicken model, as government shutdowns are more harmful to
Democratic Party priorities than to Republican Party
priorities. 254
Finally, the uncertainty created by game-of-chicken
negotiations, coupled with the occasions on which governments
actually shut down, tends to erode long-term public trust in
government. As noted previously, public approval declines not
just for all parties in the wake of a shutdown or near shutdown,
but also for the institutions of government themselves. 255
Coinciding with the rise of the new fiscal politics, long-term
trust in America's basic political institutions has in recent
years hovered near record lows. 2 56
C. The Likelihood of Future Government Shutdowns
Although most states had recovered from their post-
financial crisis nadirs by early 2014, many still face significant
long-term fiscal shortfalls: according to the Center on Budget
Policy and Priorities, state governments faced $55 billion in
budget shortfalls for the fiscal year 2013, an average of 9.5
percent of the states' entire fiscal-year budgets, and this after
four consecutive years of over $100 billion in total budget
shortfalls annually. 257 Further, the cyclical nature of state
254. Thus, as we suggested in Part I.C supra, the recent government
shutdowns are generally consistent with a story in which Republicans are
tempted to take very aggressive positions due to the Democrats' greater aversion
to government shutdowns. The limitation to this tendency is that the voting
public then observes the Republicans taking a hard line and tends to blame
Republicans more for government shutdowns. But see Jonathan Chait, Must
Democrats Act Like Such Wimps? Actually, Yes., NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.newrepublic.comlblog/jonathan-chait86237/must-democratsact-such-
wimps-actually-yes, archived at http://perma.cc/R7EB-JT4Z (arguing that
Democrats must compromise not because their voting coalition comprises public
sector employees, but because it comprises more moderates who "want their
leaders to compromise and act pragmatically").
255. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
256. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 18,
2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-interactive/,
archived at http://perma.cc/987B-99RS (finding that public trust in the
government, already quite low, fell even lower in a survey conducted during the
October 2013 government shutdown).
257. PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, STATES
CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION'S IMPACT (July 27, 2012), available at http://www.
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financing is such that future budget shortfalls are almost
certain,258 especially with over a trillion dollars outstanding in
unsustainable and underfunded pension, health, and other
obligations to state employees. 259 Indeed, some state and local
governments continue to borrow against future tax revenues to
fund present-day expenses. 260 Meanwhile, at the federal level,
the prospect of another shutdown is not insignificant, insofar
as the conservative anti-tax movement continues to maintain
its grip over the Republican Party, while the trend toward
increased polarization continues. 261
In short, we expect that negotiation failures leading to
state government shutdowns will resume with the next
economic downturn. At the federal level, there is no end in
sight to the continually resurging budget fights that threaten
government shutdowns or other dire budgetary consequences
desired by neither political party.
Despite the nearly universal decline in popular approval
for legislative and executive leaders in the wake of shutdowns
or near shutdowns, the nature of the new fiscal politics-
increased party polarization, strong ideological opposition to
tax increases, voter aversion to hard fiscal policy choices, and
cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa--view&id=711, archived at http://perma.cc/94SE-E7W3.
258. For a discussion of the cyclical nature of state budget financing, see
Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises, supra note 247.
259. The State Budget Crisis Task Force estimates that nationwide, state and
local government pensions are underfunded by at least $1 trillion and by as much
as $3 trillion depending on estimates. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, REPORT
OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 35 (July 17, 2012), http:/www.
statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-
Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/USX6-DSSQ. In California,
observers speculate that the state's California Public Employees Retirement
System has an unfunded liability of nearly $300 billion in addition to another
$100 billion in unfunded retiree health care obligations. Dan Walters, California
Pension Funds Still Face Huge Liabilities, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://www.sacbee.com12013/01/28/5144933/dan-walters-california-pension.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/manage/created-links/volume-86-issue-1/gamage; see
also Steven Malanga, The Pension Fund That Ate California, 23 CITY J. 1 (2013).
260. Ian Lovett, California Schools Finance Upgrades by Making the Next
Generation Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2013, at A25, available at http:/www.
nytimes.com/2013/02/10/us/lOschools.html, archived at http://perma.cc/635C-
94FF.
261. Thomas E. Mann, Admit It, Political Scientists: Politics Really Is More
Broken Than Ever, ATLANTIC (May 26, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic
.comlpolitics/archive/2014/05dysfunctionl371544/, archived at http://perma.cc/
UG67-3U8V ("[Tlhe parties in Congress are as polarized-internally unified and
distinctive from one another-as any time in history. And the 2012 electorate was
the most polarized ever.").
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the absence of default budgets-nonetheless encourages game-
of-chicken-style politics that risk such negotiation failures.
Accordingly, to alleviate the harms caused by budget
negotiation failures and end the risk of costly government
shutdowns, Part IV calls for the adoption of default budget
policies.
IV. THE CASE FOR DEFAULT BUDGETS
Having described what we call the new fiscal politics and
the harms that result from the new fiscal politics, 262 we now
discuss how default budget policies could alleviate many of
these harms. Many have called for reduced partisanship in
Washington and in state capitals: some hope that proposals
such as non-partisan redistricting or non-party primaries
might succeed in reducing partisanship and thereby alleviate
the risk of negotiation failures resulting in government
shutdowns. 263 For the purposes of this discussion, we take no
position on the desirability or merits of these broader proposals
to alter the composition of Congress or the electoral process. 264
262. It is worth noting here that we are not arguing that successful budget
negotiations under the game-of-chicken model necessarily produce worse
outcomes than do budget negotiations under the logrolling model. For instance, a
plausible argument can be made that budgets negotiations under the logrolling
model are likely to produce more wasteful pork-barrel spending and special-
interest tax provisions, since individual legislators will more easily secure their
preferred outcomes at the expense of the larger electorates' preferences. We argue
only that budget negotiations under the game-of-chicken model are far more likely
to result in negotiation failures, thus increasing the risk of government
shutdowns. Even if the harms that result from the logrolling model are worse
than the negotiation-failure-related harms that result from the game-of-chicken
model, we should still strive to address the harmful consequences of negotiation
failures and to mitigate those harms to the extent possible. See supra Part I.B.
263. See, e.g., Phil Keisling, To Reduce Partisanship, Get Rid of Partisans, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/opinion/22keisling
.html, archived at http://perma.ccW38E-W9Y5 (arguing for the abolition of party
primaries to reduce partisanship). California voters recently passed a ballot
initiative to move to non-partisan primaries in state elections in part in the hope
that it might lead to the election of more moderate candidates. Jennifer Medina,
Nonpartisan Primaries Face Test in California As Way to End Gridlock, N.Y.
TIMES (June 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/us/politics/ california-
tests-nonpartisan-primaries.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZN8G-8E7W.
Indeed, empirical research suggests non-partisan primaries will produce
candidates closer to the median voter. See Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B.
Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304
(1998).
264. One of the authors has previously discussed some of the limitations on
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We think it unlikely that any of these proposals alone will
prove to be a panacea, and we thus expect the trend of
heightened partisanship to remain part of the United States
political landscape for the foreseeable future. Consequently, we
expect that the threat of budget negotiation failures is here to
stay.
Rather than attempting the Sisyphean task of exhorting
Democrats and Republicans to work together on bipartisan
budget compromises, we instead advocate for implementation
of default budget policies that would automatically trigger
when negotiation failure occurs. If we are correct in predicting
that the risk of negotiation failure is here to stay, then reforms
should aim at reducing the harmful consequences of such
failure. That negotiation failure can result in government
shutdowns at the United States federal and state levels is a
consequence of existing budgeting rules. Instead of leading to
government shutdowns, however, budgeting rules could be
reformed so that negotiation failure would instead result in the
automatic, though temporary, implementation of some form of
default budget policy.
Several forms of partial default budget policies already
exist, and these are instructive for understanding how our
proposal for a full default budget policy might be implemented.
This Part discusses two of these forms: the automatic
continuing appropriations provisions in place in two states-
Rhode Island and Wisconsin-and the United States federal
sequestration policy that has been enacted on and off since
1985. While the former are straightforward examples of partial
default budget policies (with these two states thus serving as
classic "laboratories" of state-level experimentation),265 the
latter may at first glance appear to have little in common with
default budget policies. However, as we show, sequestration
functions as a classic default rule: it alters the status quo
environment in the event of negotiation failure, thus forcing
campaign finance reform and how campaign finance reform should be
restructured in light of those limitations, but this discussion does not directly
relate to the problem of government shutdowns. See David S. Gamage, Taxing
Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113
YALE L.J. 1283 (2004).
265. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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legislators to draft in the shadow of the pre-specified default
outcomes. The federal experience with sequestration provides
several important lessons about how default rules can
positively alter budget negotiations. This Part also explores
how default budget policies might be implemented. Finally, we
discuss one set of alternatives to budget default policies-
compromise-forcing devices-that could also prevent
government shutdowns by punishing legislators for negotiation
failure. We explain why we believe these compromise devices
are, and have been, an ineffective second-best solution to
preventing shutdowns and near shutdowns altogether via
default budget policies.
A. The Policies Adopted in Wisconsin and Rhode Island
Although default budget policies have been proposed at the
federal level on at least several occasions, 266 the most extensive
of the existing default budget policies employed are at the state
level-in Wisconsin and Rhode Island. In Wisconsin, if the
266. From the late 1980s until at least 1996, Republican Representative
George Gekas of Pennsylvania introduced, every legislative term, a bill which
would have provided for the adoption of a federal-level automatic continuing
appropriation provision in the event that no budget was enacted by September
30th. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 18,896-97 (1996) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
Looking beyond proposals, Congress has at least twice given serious
consideration to the implementation of automatic continuing resolution
provisions. In 1999, the 106th Congress, during the legislative drafting process for
H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act, considered both a two-
year budget cycle and an automatic continuing resolution that, like the automatic
continuing appropriations in Wisconsin and Rhode Island, would have continued
funding of government services in the event that legislators were unable to reach
a compromise. Subtitle D of the Act would have amended Title 31 of the United
States Code to establish the automatic continuation of discretionary funding for
all federal programs in the event that legislators failed to enact any of the regular
appropriations acts on time. To Consider Budget Process Reform, Joint Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Budget & the S. Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 106th Cong.
15 (1999) (statement of Sen. McCain).
During a hearing before the Committee on the Budget in the House of
Representatives, Representative Jim Nussle of Iowa stated that the purpose
behind the automatic continuing resolution was to "prevent future government
shutdowns" and to "take away from both the President and Congress the incentive
to refuse to negotiate in good faith on appropriation bills on the assumption that
one side or the other will bear the wrath of the public for shutting down the
Federal Government." Id. at 30 (statement of Rep. Nussle). Likewise,
Representative Benjamin J. Cardin of Maryland also advocated for the automatic
continuing resolution, arguing it would "guard against the uncertainty and
instability of future government shutdowns." Id. at 20 (statement of Sen. Cardin).
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state legislature "does not amend or eliminate any existing
appropriations on or before the beginning of a new biennium,
all existing appropriations are in effect in the new fiscal year
and all subsequent fiscal years until amended or
eliminated." 267  In other words, if the Wisconsin state
legislature fails to pass a new budget or other appropriation
bills, the previously existing budget goes into effect until the
state legislature finalizes a new one. Similarly, in Rhode
Island, in "an emergency caused by a failure of the general
assembly to pass the annual appropriations bill, the same
amounts appropriated in the previous fiscal years are available
to each department and division."268 Again, if negotiation
failures result in the state legislature not passing a budget, the
previously existing budget goes into effect, thereby averting a
government shutdown.
These partial default budget policies are often called
"automatic continuing appropriations provisions"269  or
"automatic funding approaches," 270 among other terms. What
distinguishes these provisions from full default budget policies
is that no method is specified for how to proceed if collected tax
revenues are insufficient to fund the automatic continuing
appropriations. 271 At the state level, where balanced budget
provisions limit the states' abilities to deficit spend, it may not
be possible to simply maintain the prior year's authorization
levels, at least during periods of economic downturn in which
revenues are declining. 272 A full default budget policy thus
must specify how spending levels or tax rates would be
adjusted in the event of a revenue shortfall.
Nevertheless, Wisconsin and Rhode Island have come close
to implementing full default budget policies, and the experience
of these two states is illustrative. Perhaps knowing they can
fall back on a default budget policy, Wisconsin lawmakers have
often failed to pass a budget by the state's June 30th
267. WIS. STAT. § 20.002(1)(b)(2) (2014).
268. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-3-19 (2013).
269. COLBEY SULLIVAN, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, POLICY BRIEF:
AUTOMATIC CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS AND GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS (Dec.
2011), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/contappr.pdf.
270. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108.
271. In contrast, for example, sequestration legislation typically includes some
prescription for how automatic budget cuts will be implemented to ensure a
budget running a deficit is balanced. For a further discussion of the role of
sequestration as a form of partial budget default policy, see infra Part IV.B.
272. Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises, supra note 247, at 754-65.
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deadline.273 Sometimes negotiation failures and political
impasse have prevented the state legislature from passing a
budget on time; in other instances, the governor has simply
been able to take a few extra weeks to review the budget before
signing it.274 Regardless, Wisconsin lawmakers have always
eventually come together to pass a new budget. 275 The longest
Wisconsin has delayed before passing a new budget was until
November 4th (in 1971).276 In more recent years, the longest
delay was until October 27th (in 2007).277 According to Bob
Lang, the Director of the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau
in 2011, Wisconsin's default budget provision has been effective
in preventing government shutdowns: far from leaving
Wisconsin running on autopilot, the legislature has always
passed a budget because of pressure from local governments
and from the general public. 278
Similarly, although Rhode Island's partial default budget
provision has been in place since 1935, Rhode Island has only
twice failed to adopt an on-time budget, in 1992 and in 1993.279
In both of those instances, a new budget was adopted within
roughly two weeks of the missed deadline. 280 According to
Sharon Reynolds Ferland, Rhode Island's House Fiscal Advisor
in 2011, Rhode Island's default budget provision "does not
appear to decrease lawmakers' incentive to enact a new
budget."281
Wisconsin and Rhode Island's approaches-having the
previous year's budget authorizations remain in effect until
new budget authorizations are passed-suffice to prevent
government shutdowns during periods of economic growth
when tax revenues are flat or increasing, since blunt
maintenance of the status quo won't incur deficit spending. Yet
this approach falls short of offering a full default budget policy.
During economic downturns, maintaining the previous years'
budget authorizations may offer only a temporary solution, as
273. SULLIVAN, supra note 269, at 7.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 8.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. (reporting a phone conversation with Bob Lang, Director of the
Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. (reporting an email response from Sharon Reynolds Ferland, Rhode
Island House Fiscal Advisor).
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the reduced tax revenues that typically result from economic
downturns will eventually cause the state to run out of money.
Were Wisconsin or Rhode Island to fail to pass new budget
authorizations for a sufficiently long period during which tax
revenues were falling, the eventual result would be a
government shutdown. 282 That this has never happened in
either state suggests that the threat of a government shutdown
is not needed to induce legislators to compromise and pass a
budget-a theme we will discuss further below.
Beyond Wisconsin and Rhode Island, eleven states have
provisions whereby the state legislature can choose to pass
temporary appropriations if a full budget is not passed by the
deadline, and twelve states have provisions whereby some
payments automatically continue in the absence of the state
passing a new full or partial budget.283 Only twenty-two states
have rules that result in a full government shutdown if a new
budget is not passed on time. 284 In the majority of states, then,
if state lawmakers fail to authorize either new permanent or
temporary appropriations the result is a partial government
shutdown. In these states, failure to pass a budget by the
deadline can result in a partial government shutdown even
when the state has sufficient tax revenues to fund the entirety
of the previous year's expenditures.
B. Sequestration as a Partial Default Budget Policy
Beyond the states, the federal experience implementing
various forms of automatic budget restrictions, commonly
known as budget sequestration, can also serve as a helpful
lesson in thinking about the various ways in which a default
budget policy might be implemented. Sequestration suggests
that automatic continuing appropriations are unlikely to
become permanent as legislators decline to take action and
allow the government to run on autopilot.
Sequestration was first implemented as part of the
282. Id. at 12 ("The de facto enactment of an unbalanced budget could mean
that, in the absence of a new budget, the state would run out of money at some
point toward the end of the biennium, leading to a shutdown.").
283. See NCSL Late State Budgets, supra note 248.
284. Id. In eleven states, government officials apparently do not know what
procedures would be required if a budget is late because state law does not
directly address the issue and because the states' budgets have always been
passed on time.
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Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(often known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act for the bill's
principal sponsors).285 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was
enacted in order to effect the gradual reduction of annual
federal budget deficits by requiring adherence to strict deficit
targets, with the long-term goal to eliminate the federal budget
deficit altogether. 286 This aim was accomplished through
sequestration. In order to keep the annual budget within
mandated deficit reduction parameters, automatic spending
cuts would be implemented across all discretionary spending
areas at the beginning of the fiscal year if necessary. 287 Since
this was "perceived to be drastic action, many regarded it as
providing a strong incentive for Congress and the President to
reach agreement on established budgetary goals through the
regular legislative process. ' 288  Thus in implementing
sequestration, Congress tied its hands in the future to ensure
that even if Congress failed to meet its previously stated deficit
reduction targets in annual budget negotiations, the reduction
targets would be effectuated nevertheless.
This process originally involved the adjustment of the
budget by the Comptroller General, an executive officer
impeachable by Congress, after Congress had passed the
budget and the President had signed it.289 Famously, the
Supreme Court found the Comptroller General to be an agent
of Congress and held that Congress could not usurp from the
executive branch the execution of its laws, concluding that the
sequestration procedure under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act was unconstitutional. 290 Importantly, this suggests that
were a default budget policy to be implemented at the federal
level, its execution must be delegated to the executive branch.
Nevertheless, this constitutional requirement is easily met:
Congress went on to amend the sequestration process in 1987,
assigning the task of sequestration to the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget, an agent indisputably and solely
285. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (2012)).
286. ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31137, SEQUESTRATION





290. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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of the executive branch. 291
Although the procedures for sequestration have changed
over the years, sequestration became newsworthy again in
2011 when Democrats agreed to sequestration in exchange for
an increase in the federal debt ceiling. As part of the Budget
Control Act of 2011,292 Congress mandated $1.2 trillion in
multi-year budget cuts across many areas of federal spending,
to be specified by a specially established Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction. 293 Importantly, however, the
law mandated that if the Committee were unable to agree on
how to reduce $1.2 trillion from the budget, automatic
sequestration and across-the-board cuts to both defense and
non-defense discretionary spending would take place. 294 Quite
predictably in the era of new fiscal politics, the Committee
failed,295 and sequestration went into effect in early 2013 with
blunt, broad-based cuts designed to reach the $1.2 trillion
target in spending reductions over the next eight years. 296
Sequestration automatically took effect when Congress did not
act to pass a new budget agreement. In this sense,
sequestration is a form of default budget policy. By establishing
a default, Congress could negotiate from a new baseline
knowing with more certainty what negotiation failure would
bring.
Congress's experience with sequestration in the 1980s
suggests that setting future defaults can help reduce year-to-
year uncertainty and produce budget compromises. For the
fiscal years 1986, 1988, and 1990, Congress initially set federal
discretionary appropriations at levels that would exceed deficit
reductions targets required by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
291. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Contril Reaffirmation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987).
292. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011)
[hereinafter Budget Control Act].
293. Ford Fessenden et al., The Plans for Reducing the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/22/us/politics/2011
0722-comparing-deficit-reduction-plans.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MDZ4-
9JBT.
294. Budget Control Act, supra note 292.
295. See Janet Hook & Naftali Bendavid, Deficit Panel Folds Its Tent, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020
4443404577052311834234128, archived at http://perma.cc/P55Q-FSX2.
296. Michael D. Shear, Across-the-Board Cuts Take Effect, But Their Impact Is
Not Immediately Felt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.comI2013/
03/03/us/politics/Spending-Cuts-Imposed-US-Starts-to-Trim-Its-Budget.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/X7DV-FXTH.
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Act.297 In the first fiscal year, 1986, automatic sequestration
reduced appropriations by $11.7 billion in automatic across-
the-board cuts. 298 Perhaps learning from this, when Congress
was projected to surpass its deficit reduction target by $20
billion for the 1988 fiscal year budget, it reached a budget
summit agreement to avoid sequestration. 299 Likewise, during
the 1990 fiscal year, an initial estimated sequestration of $16.1
billion was reduced to $4.55 billion by a subsequent omnibus
budget reconciliation act.300 In both years, Congress's prior
commitment to automatic deficit reduction eliminated
uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of Congressional
budget making: it was certain that these reductions in
appropriations would take place, regardless of whether they
happened automatically or by subsequent and deliberate
Congressional action. 30 1 Sequestration during these years
appears to have twice brought congressional leaders together to
compromise and make cuts in a deliberate and thoughtful
fashion. 302
In a similar manner, Congress implemented sequestration
in 2011 to achieve long-term deficit reduction goals.303 Even
the bipartisan budget agreement passed at the end of 2013,
which sought to "eas[e] across-the-board spending cuts," still
used sequestration as the baseline from which to alter
appropriations targets. While the ultimate agreement
permitted increased spending of $62 billion over two years, it
was offset by $85 billion in cuts to be made over ten years. 304
Sequestration has thus repeatedly functioned as a form of
default akin to a form of default budget policy: it establishes
automatic baselines and reduces the leverage parties have to
threaten to walk away from negotiations. Inaction will no






303. See Budget Control Act, supra note 292, § 251A ('Unless a joint
committee bill achieving an amount greater than $1,200,000,000,000 in deficit
reduction ... is enacted by January 15, 2012, the discretionary spending limits
listed in section 251(c) shall be revised, and discretionary appropriations and
direct spending shall be reduced ... "').
304. Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama Signs Budget Agreement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26,
2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023047535045792828732516
26400, archived at http://perma.cc/65JB-A5LQ.
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longer lead to catastrophe, but instead automatic default
policies. 305
Some might suggest that sequestration shows that default
policies may be less temporary than we anticipate, given the
dysfunctional nature of today's Congress. As contemporary
sequestration has shown, even a default budget highly
undesirable to both parties was not a sufficient stick to
motivate Congress to reach an agreement over a new budget
before sequestration took effect. 30 6 One might be concerned,
then, that a default budget policy would lead to a federal fiscal
policy on autopilot, unresponsive to the country's immediate
policy and spending needs. 30 7
Yet we think this is not the lesson of sequestration. Even
in this era of new fiscal politics, members of Congress want-
and need-to take credit for action. Congressional Republicans
fulfilled their pledge to their more conservative constituents to
enact significant budget cuts,30 8  while Congressional
Democrats pleased liberals by warding off deep cuts to social
welfare programs and including defense spending among the
targets of sequestration. 30 9  Despite sequestration's
305. See, e.g., Fred Barnes, The Upside of the GOP Shutdown Defeat, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 21, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303448104579149
741045522708, archived at .http://perma.cc/M3QR-K88E
306. See Hook & Bendavid, supra note 295 (describing how the sequestration
cuts target programs dear to both Democrats and Republicans); Carl Hulse &
Helene Cooper, Obama and Leaders Reach Debt Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/us/politics/01FISCAL.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/6HBX-5UYP ("The rationale for picking favored programs like the
Pentagon for Republicans and Medicare for Democrats was to provide a strong
incentive for the new committee to avoid a deadlock and deliver a deficit reduction
plan that could clear Congress.").
307. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 269, at 10 ("[S]ome may argue that
[automatic continuing appropriations] would reduce the incentive for the
legislature and governor to agree upon a new budget in a timely manner.
Currently, the threat or existence of a shutdown may add a sense of urgency to
the budget debate and could hasten the inevitable resolution of differences.").
308. See Sarah Wheaton, Boehner's Debt Ceiling Agreement Presentation, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.cominteractive/2011/08/01/us/politics/
20110801_BOEHNER DEBTFRAMEWORK.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
82MZ-T3ZM. Speaker John Boehner emphasized how the agreement achieved
Republican objectives to "cut government spending more than it increases the
debt limit [and] implements spending caps to reduce future spending... without
tax hikes, which would destroy jobs, while preventing a job-killing national
default." Id. at 1.
309. See Jonathan Weisman, Parties Focus on the Positive as Budget Cuts
Draw Near, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com2013/02/28/
us/politics/parties-focus-on-the-positive-as-budget-cuts-near.html, archived at
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implementation, legislators remained able to negotiate around
it in ways that were satisfactory to both Democrats and
Republicans. 3 10 Adopting a full default budget policy would
deny all lawmakers the ability to claim any measure of victory
if Congress failed to pass a budget and a default policy went
into effect. Lawmakers would likely receive criticism from the
press, hear from dissatisfied citizens and donors, and
eventually face primary threats from challengers lambasting a
do nothing Congress. Indeed, the desire of both parties to claim
credit-taking action led Congress to alter the sequestration
defaults in a rare moment of bipartisan budget agreement at
the end of 2013.311
For these reasons, we think sequestration serves as an
example of a partial default budget policy that ensures
implementation of previously determined outcomes even in the
face of partisan budget negotiation failure. Sequestration can
thus be thought of as a form of a partial default budget policy
that is intended to be temporary but that can function semi-
permanently if Congress fails to negotiate an alternative.
C. Implementing Default Budgets
Should Congress or state legislatures choose to implement
a full default budget policy, they might proceed in a number of
ways. This section explores some of these possibilities and the
considerations that they entail.
First, and most obviously, the actual budget from the prior
year could automatically be re-authorized as the new default
budget, in a fashion similar to proposals for automatic
continuing appropriations provisions. 312 The prior year's
discretionary appropriations would simply continue as before,
maintaining the status quo spending levels until a new budget
http://perma.cc/9FFR-A2H6 ("Some of the most liberal members of Congress see
the cuts as a rare opportunity to whittle down Pentagon spending. The poor are
already shielded from the worst of the cuts, and the process could take pressure
off the Democratic Party, at least in the short run, to tamper with Social Security
and Medicare.").
310. See Jonathan Weisman, Capitol Leaders Agree to a Deal on the Budget,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/11/us/politics/party-
leaders-indicate-deal-is-reached-on-budget.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X99J-
XVML (discussing how the revised budget reduced both defense cuts and also
domestic programs).
311. Nelson, supra note 304.
312. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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could be passed. As discussed previously, this approach would
not represent a full default budget policy at the state level, due
to the states' balanced budget requirements limiting their
ability to incur deficits during economic downturns. However,
at the federal level, where deficit spending is less restricted,
this approach could potentially function as a full default budget
policy (at least in the absence of an active sequestration
policy). 313 Moreover, this approach would in some ways be the
simplest, as federal agencies would not need to make
temporary and sudden adjustments to outlays. However,
because federal revenues are in constant flux, in down
economic years this could lead to unexpected deficits if such a
default budget policy were in operation for a significant portion
of the following fiscal year. This could then lead to problems if
a given Congress had also committed to a sequestration policy.
Another default budget option could be implementing a
modified version of the prior year's budget, made to reflect
changes in population and economic climate. These
modifications could be made to spending, to revenue
generation, or to both. One possible approach for default
budgets would thus be for an administrative agency to adjust
taxes and spending-following predetermined formulas-so
that the default budget would remain balanced (or imbalanced
at previously specified levels) in light of economic changes. 3 14
This would mirror the role of the Director of the OMB in
automatically implementing sequestration in years in which
Congress's legislative actions led to year-end deficits. 3 15
Further, although such actions might arguably be more
insulated from voter accountability, public choice scholars
suggest this may still be more desirable to voters than
elected-but more inexpert-politicians. 316
313. Conceivably, at the federal level, all spending could be managed under the
default budget in the same fashion as Social Security is currently managed.
Spending could then continue to be authorized at the same levels as in the prior
year (or perhaps with adjustments made for inflation or economic growth), with
any gap between spending and taxes met by deficit borrowing. However, if the
disconnect between taxes and spending became too severe, Congress would
eventually need to take action (as has been done for Social Security).
314. For a discussion of how this might work in Minnesota, see SULLIVAN,
supra note 269, at 12-13.
315. See supra notes 290-292 and accompanying text.
316. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 110 (2000) (arguing that if the agency's
values are no more dissimilar to the median voter's values than are the median
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A default budget policy could also be negotiated as part of
the regular annual budget-making process. For example, the
legislature could assign itself the task of regularly producing
both a new budget for year T and a default budget for year T+1.
If negotiations failed for year T+1, the last agreed-upon default
budget would go into effect instead. That budget could then be
based on the legislature's desires for future years, or could be
designed to function as a penalty default in a manner similar to
sequestration. Painful across-the-board cuts or tax hikes could
encourage future legislators to agree to a new budget and
curtail the automatic (but miserly) continuing appropriations.
Of course, this approach risks the penalty default budget going
into effect in the event of negotiation failure, but this would
almost certainly be preferable to the government shutting
down-the result of negotiation failure under current budget
rules. As Congress's recent experience with sequestration has
shown, sequestration is tolerable, if undesirable, and can also
spur bipartisan budget agreements in a political climate in
which they are otherwise exceedingly rare.
An even more ambitious default budget policy would be
one that empowers a panel of citizens to produce a default
budget that would then become law if the legislature did not
pass a new budget by a specified date. Or, as a variation on this
approach, an administrative agency or some elected official
could be charged with producing the default budget.3 17 Almost
certainly, this could only be implemented at the state level,
given federal constitutional limitations.
We are largely ambivalent as to how specifically a default
budget policy should be enacted. 318 Any default budget policy
that maintains government functions by specifying what
actions should be taken if new budget authorizations are not
passed (and addresses the possibility of declining tax revenues)
would be suitable. Any of the approaches for implementing a
elected politician's values, then the median voter prefers that the agency make
the policy choice, since the agency has access to the largest amount of accurate
information).
317. These more ambitious possibilities are more realistic at the state level,
and particularly in California where the Constitution can be amended through a
simple majority vote of the electorate. Reforms that would require a constitutional
amendment are, needless to say, much less plausible at the federal level.
318. For a more elaborate discussion of options for implementing a federal-
level default budget policy, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
108, at 32-43.
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default budget policy that we discuss above would end the
threat of costly government shutdowns and near shutdowns, a
vast improvement from the current dysfunctional budget-
making system.
Importantly, the composition of the default budget will
likely affect the bargaining power of the two parties in their
negotiations to pass a regular budget. Some forms of default
budget policies might result in one party having a structural
advantage in budgeting negotiations, just as we argue that at
present the Republican Party enjoys a structural advantage
from their comparative lack of concern about the policy-
outcome consequences of government shutdowns. 319 It may
ultimately prove impossible to design a default budget so that
neither party has any structural advantage whatsoever.320
Nevertheless, we argue that the existence of any such
advantage should be brought into the open through discussions
of the composition of the default budget.
Under any default budget policy, if the minority party
prefers the default budget to the budget proposals of the
majority party, the minority party can block the passage of a
regular budget so that the default budget goes into effect. We
do not view this outcome as necessarily problematic. Again, a
default budget policy makes budgeting more like other areas of
domestic policy or entitlement spending, where the minority
party can block new legislation or reforms if it prefers the
status quo to the majority party's proposals. This outcome is a
natural result of a system of governance with many vetogates
that permit the minority party to stop or slow the majority
party's policies from being implemented. We do not view this
outcome as being any less democratic or improper for
budgeting than in any other area of legislation.321
Nevertheless, it is worth evaluating further the role that the
threat of government shutdowns might play as a compromise-
forcing device; we analyze this question in the following
section.
319. See supra notes 69-70, 95 and 253 and accompanying text.
320. A default budget could, for example, both raise taxes (which would be
unpopular with conservatives) and cut social spending (likely unpopular with
liberals).
321. The problem of government shutdowns could alternatively be addressed
by removing some of the veto points that currently obstruct the adoption of
budgets-for instance, the power to pass a budget could be placed solely in one
legislative chamber or the executive could be prevented from vetoing budgets.
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D. Compromise-Forcing Devices
One argument against default budget proposals is that the
threat of a government shutdown is necessary to force
legislators to compromise and pass a new budget.322 In this
sense, the threat of a government shutdown functions as a
compromise-forcing mechanism. Some might argue that with
automatic budgets to fall back on, legislators will neither
govern nor be accountable to voters. Without the threat of
government shutdowns, veto players might find it too easy to
block a new budget from being passed. Even worse, this
argument goes, compromise might become harder to achieve,
since each veto player could afford to dig in their heels. As
policy needs naturally evolve over time, the failure to pass new
budgets could also lead to misallocation and waste, insofar as
the default budgets might not optimally reallocate resources to
account for changing circumstances. 323 In this section, we
explain why we think the threat of a government shutdown is
an ineffective compromise-forcing device that insufficiently
punishes legislators for failing to come to an agreement while
simultaneously punishing voters instead.
Although Wisconsin and Rhode Island provide only two
data points on the efficacy of a default budget policy, these
states' experiences suggest that concerns over the need for
compromise-forcing devices may be overblown: in both states,
legislators have always passed new budgets no later than early
into the next fiscal year. 324 The partial default budget policies
of both states have simply averted government shutdowns
during the periods in which state legislators and governors
322. See supra note 307; see also Richard Kogan, Proposal for Automatic
Continuing Resolutions Would Likely Make it Harder to Pass Regular
Appropriations Bills, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (June 24, 2004),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa--view&id=1984, archived at http://perma
.ccIZ7TA-PJ25 ("The proposals [sic] main purpose is to avoid government
shutdowns. But its principal effect would likely be to disrupt the appropriations
process and make appropriations bills harder to pass."); ROBERT KEITH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL30339, PREVENTING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS:
PROPOSALS FOR AN AUTOMATIC CONTINUING RESOLUTION 7 (2000) ("The major
concern of opponents of ACR proposals is that they could serve as a disincentive to
enact the regular appropriations bills in a timely manner, or even at all.").
323. See SULLIVAN, supra note 269, at 10 (discussing the risk of a possible
"mismatch between base funding and current public sentiment").
324. Id. Indeed, in Rhode Island the legislature has only twice failed to pass a
budget on time.
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have negotiated the terms of the next year's budget. We thus
see no convincing reason to think that a default budget policy,
if implemented broadly, would lead to chronic, long-term, and
detrimental reliance on default budgets.
As we discussed above, politicians win reelection by
delivering for their constituents and the interest groups on
whose support they rely. We expect that veto players' desires to
shape policy by enacting new budgets should suffice as a
compromise-forcing mechanism in most circumstances. To the
extent that default budgets do go into effect during periods of
negotiation failure, and to the extent that these default budgets
misallocate resources due to changing circumstances, the
voters and interest groups adversely affected by these resource
misallocations would likely pressure veto players to
compromise on a new budget. Ultimately, any harms resulting
from allowing a default budget to remain in effect would at
worst mirror the harms from sequestration, and would likely
induce compromise in a similar fashion. Furthermore, having a
default budget policy in place might actually make lawmakers
more accountable to their constituents. At present, game-of-
chicken negotiations frequently lead to last-minute, behind-
closed-doors budget agreements in which it is often unclear
how certain provisions originated, making it difficult for voters
to allocate blame (or credit) to individual lawmakers. 325
For these reasons, we doubt the need for a compromise-
forcing device beyond the general incentives for political actors
to pass new budgets in order to provide for their constituents
and interest groups. Were default budget policies to be widely
implemented, we would not be surprised if default budgets
were sometimes allowed to go into effect for short time periods,
as has often been the case in Wisconsin. Yet we expect that in
all but the most extraordinary of circumstances new budgets
would be passed well before the default budget would pose
serious resource misallocation or governing accountability
325. See, e.g., Natasha Lennard, How the Monsanto Protection Act Snuck Into
Law, SALON (Mar. 27, 2013, 4:44 PM), http://www.salon.com2013/03/27/
how themonsantoprotection-act-snuck_intojlaw/, archived at http://perma.cc/
Y6YQ-XH3Z. Lennard describes the last-minute introduction of the so-called
Monsanto Protection Act, which was slipped anonymously into an Agriculture
Appropriations Bill and which would protect genetically modified seeds from
litigation: "[M]any members of Congress were apparently unaware that the
'Monsanto Protection Act' even existed within the spending bill, HR 933; they
voted in order to avert a government shutdown." Id.
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concerns.
We might be mistaken in these predictions. If so, we view
the harms resulting from the threat of government shutdowns
as more concerning than any harms that might result from the
implementation of a default budget policy. Moreover, if a
compromise-forcing device is needed, then maintaining the
threat of government shutdowns strikes us as a poor candidate.
The adoption of a default budget policy could be combined with
the creation of new, better-designed, compromise-forcing
mechanisms.
The threat of government shutdowns as a compromise-
forcing device is inapt because it primarily impacts the public
at large rather than the political actors responsible for passing
a budget. In contrast, better-designed, compromise-forcing
mechanisms should target politicians and especially veto
players-those responsible for passing the budget. Those
hardest hit during government shutdowns are often
constituents who rely on government services and state
workers who will be furloughed for the duration of the
shutdown. In contrast, legislators often face no direct
consequences whatsoever. 326 A properly designed compromise-
forcing mechanism would allocate more of the costs of
negotiation failure to the politicians responsible for negotiating
budgets, rather than to citizens.
Most straightforwardly, the failure to pass a budget on
time could trigger either the docking of legislators' salaries or
the delay of salary payments until a new budget is passed and
implemented, a so-called "no budget, no pay" policy. 327 When
combined with the implementation of a default budget policy,
this approach would allocate the costs of negotiation failure
more on legislators and less on the public. Of course, the
effectiveness of this strategy depends in part on the degree to
326. Arguably, legislators may suffer long-term effects to their approval
ratings and chances for reelection, but these do not seem to be substantial enough
to ward off complicity in negotiation failures and subsequent shutdowns.
327. California's Constitution contains such a provision, prohibiting all salary
and travel and expense reimbursement for members of the Legislature if a budget
has not passed the Legislature by the June 15 deadline. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §
12(h). This has also been implemented by the state of New York and withstood
constitutional scrutiny. L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: Constitutional
Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Officials, 26 J. LEGIS. 221, 246-47 (2000).
"No budget, no pay" bills have also been introduced in Congress, and have even
been passed by the Senate, but have languished in conference and never been
implemented as law. Id. at 248.
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which legislators rely on their salaries: eighteen states have
part-time legislators who make an average of $15,984 per year,
while an additional twenty-three states with full-time
legislators provide an average salary of $35,326. This suggests
that most legislators likely generate significant income from
other sources. 328 Even in the full-time United States Congress,
most legislators have significant wealth outside their salary as
an elected representative. 329 To the extent that most draw the
majority of their income from other sources, docking legislative
pay may not be sufficiently punitive to alter negotiating
positions. We might also worry that docking legislators' pay
would disproportionately impact less wealthy legislators.
Nevertheless, although we would probably not recommend the
approach of docking legislators' pay as a result of these
concerns, this approach is suggestive of the general strategy
that we recommend. 330 At least one Senator is on record as
believing that the number of days Congress could tolerate
shutting down the government under such a policy "would
approach zero."331
As another example, since 1959, Washington State law
requires that legislators be charged with a misdemeanor if they
fail to pass a budget at least thirty days before the new
biennium. 332 However, this penalty has never been enforced,
even on the three occasions the Washington legislature was
late to pass a budget since the provision's enactment.333
Consequently, whereas docking legislative pay is probably not
328. Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEG. (June 1, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/full-and-part-time-
legislatures.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/SU2H-NW7T.
329. See Tami Luhby, The One Percenters in Congress, CNN MONEY (May 8,
2012), http:lmoney.cnn.com/2012/05/08/news/economy/congress-net-worth/index
.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/AAF2-BF2E (noting that the median net worth
in 2010 for federal Democratic lawmakers was $878,500 and for federal
Republican lawmakers was $957,500).
330. Another related approach could be to treat legislators' pay in the same
manner as state workers whose pay is adversely affected during a shutdown,
suspending payment during the crisis, and retroactively paying legislators only if
state workers are also paid. See Jonathan D. McPike, Merit Pay and Pain:
Linking Congressional Pay to Performance, 86 IND. L.J. 335, 355 (2011).
331. 141 CONG. REc. 37,539 (1995) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (quoted in
Sutin, supra note 327, at 248).
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sufficiently punitive to be an effective compromise-forcing
device, charging legislators with misdemeanors is probably too
draconian to be realistic. An effective compromise-forcing
device should thus probably fall somewhere between these
extremes.
One policy that may be desirable has already been
implemented in West Virginia. Its law dictates when the state
budget has not been passed by day 57 of the 60-day annual
legislative session, the session is automatically extended;
during this extension, only the budget can be considered. 334 To
the extent that the state's governing politicians care about
passing any measures other than the budget, this approach
pushes them to pass a compromise budget. Combined with a
default budget policy, this approach would have the potential
to induce compromise while avoiding the threat of costly
government shutdowns and near shutdowns.
Another potential and somewhat counterintuitive strategy
is to increase the consensus-threshold for agreement if a budget
is not passed on time. In Illinois, while a majority vote is
required to pass the budget until June 1, after that date the
required passage margin increases to a three-fifths majority. 335
In theory, this rule encourages lawmakers to seek consensus
knowing that agreement will be harder to achieve later. 336
More aggressive strategies along these lines might include
establishing a rule that forces turnover in party or committee
leadership if a budget is not passed on time, or even tying the
imposition of term limits to the failure to pass a budget on
time. The rules could also curtail various perks of legislators
and the President or Governor during the period in which a
new budget has not been passed.
To reiterate, we do not believe that any additional
compromise-forcing device is necessary beyond the general
incentives politicians face to pass new budgets. Further, we are
ambivalent about whether coordinating the implementation of
a default budget policy with the adoption of additional
compromise-forcing devices would be desirable. We are
ultimately not convinced that there is anything harmful about
a legislature allowing a default budget to come into effect. But
if a compromise-forcing device is thought to be necessary, much
334. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(8).
335. See Haggerty supra note 332.
336. Id.
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better alternatives exist than having budget negotiation
failures trigger government shutdowns. Instead, we would call
for compromise-forcing devices designed to impose the negative
consequences of bargaining failure on the policymakers
responsible for passing a budget instead of on the broader
public. This would also assuage those who agree that the risk
of government shutdowns is harmful, but who worry that
adopting a default budget policy would reduce incentives to
compromise. Coupling a default budget policy with better-
designed, compromise-forcing mechanisms would allow us to
have our cake and eat it too. The concern that we retain a
compromise-forcing device need not stand in the way of the
adoption of default budget policies.
CONCLUSION
Without reform, we predict that government shutdowns
and near shutdowns will remain a recurring problem at both
the United States federal and state levels. We thus propose the
adoption of default budget policies in order to prevent the
harms that are otherwise likely to arise from the political and
fiscal climate we call the new fiscal politics. Implementing
default budget policies would prevent government shutdowns
and would reduce the costly uncertainty that results from
repeated and protracted last-minute budget negotiations.
To conclude, it is worth briefly pondering the political
plausibility of default budget policies being enacted. Arguably,
the same dynamics that foster dysfunctional budget making
might lead veto players to obstruct the adoption of a default
budget policy. Yet we are cautiously optimistic. At a minimum,
in comparing possible reforms, implementing a default budget
policy should require less dramatic changes than solving the
problems of gerrymandered legislative districts or the
prevalence of vetogates in the United States system of
governance. Moreover, in some states, a default budget policy
might be enacted through the initiative or referendum process,
thereby bypassing the vetogates that thwart the ordinary
budget making process. Considering the substantial success
that tax reform advocates have had in passing ballot
initiatives-the passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978
is often considered the foundational voter rebellion against
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creeping tax burdens 337-it is not implausible to think that
voters could also rally around the prevention of costly and
embarrassing government shutdowns.
More generally, both political parties could potentially
benefit from the adoption of a default budget policy. Democrats
would obviously benefit to the extent that government
shutdowns disproportionately harm Democratic priorities and
interest groups. Yet Republicans might also benefit.
Republican Party leaders regularly face the dilemma that
appeasing the Party's base requires holding firm and resisting
compromise. Yet when this refusal to compromise leads to a
government shutdown, the Republican Party risks
disproportionately losing the support of moderate swing voters
and being blamed for the shutdown.338 Republicans might thus
be amenable to the adoption of a default budget policy so that
in future budget negotiations, Republican legislators could
follow the wishes of the Party's base with less risk of alienating
moderate swing voters. Republican legislators might also find
that a default budget policy could provide a backstop against
incremental increases in government spending, since they
could tie new spending in the next budget more closely to that
of the default budget, or else refuse to sign on.
Even under a default budget regime, the minority political
party will likely still wield considerable leverage. The majority
party will generally want to pass a new budget so as to enact
its governing priorities and appeal to its constituents. If the
minority party controls a vetogate, compromise will still be
necessary, even more so if the enactment of the default budget
policy is combined with the adoption of further compromise-
forcing devices.
In any case, it is difficult to predict the future of politics at
either the federal or state levels. Any number of possible, but
as of now unforeseen, developments could cause Congress or a
state legislature to reform its budgeting institutions at some
future date. If so, we hope that this Article will draw attention
to default budget policies as a candidate for inclusion in future
budget reform proposals.
Not so long ago, it was considered almost unthinkable that
political leaders might allow budget negotiation failures to
337. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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regularly threaten government shutdowns and related
harms.339 Yet in the environment of the new fiscal politics, the
once unthinkable has become all too commonplace. To restore
sanity to our budgetary processes, we thus call for the adoption
of default budget policies. We hope such reforms will protect
future eras from the harms of the dysfunctional budget politics
we have seen in recent decades.
339. Robert Jenkins, Think the Unthinkable on U.S. Debt, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63ffec6e-2a6a- 1 le2-a137-OO144feabdcO.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/U2T6-A5R7.
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